

MEMORIE E STUDI DIPLOMATICI

COLLANA DIRETTA DA STEFANO BALDI

A GATEWAY TO THE FUTURE

ITALY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE HELSINKI PROCESS

a cura di

Andrea Cascone

Editoriale Scientifica



Memorie e studi diplomatici

diretta da Stefano Baldi

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ANDREA CASCONI

EDITOR'S NOTE

This work is based on a previous publication “Italia-Helsinki 50”, co-edited by Stefano Baldi and Luciano Monzali and published in Italian in 2024. I am grateful to the co-editors for having brought to the attention of the Italian public the so-called “Helsinki process” and the historical events that led to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and ultimately to its transformation into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Luciano Monzali also played a crucial role in this publication and I sincerely thank him for his essential support. I am also grateful to Ambassador Lamberto Zannier for sharing his personal views and unique experience, both in the CSCE and the OSCE frameworks, with his insightful preface to this book. I would like to thank ANSA Archive and the Fondazione Flamigni di Roma/Moro Archive for the photographic material, as well as the OSCE Archive and the Archivio storico diplomatico of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for the precious research on the official statements by Italy. Last but not least, a special note of appreciation and gratitude goes to Paolo Izzo whose patience and dedication in reviewing the texts were crucial for finalizing this work.

In contrast to the Italian publication which covered a longer timeframe, this work aims at focusing on the process that led to the conference in Helsinki in the summer of 1975 and on the following political and diplomatic dynamics which paved the way to the creation of the OSCE, the so-called institutionalization process of the CSCE.

The approach followed in the publication is double folded. The first part focuses on the research and the analysis of some of the most prominent Italian scholars about the political vision and the diplomatic reflection that shaped Italy's position during the negotiations which led to Helsinki and beyond, as well as the impact on it deriving from the stances of key international players such as the United States of America

and the Soviet Union. The second part presents Italy's position throughout the official statements in the key moments of the Helsinki process.

The idea is to offer to non-speaking Italian readers the possibility to learn more about Italy's main priorities and its approach to the diplomatic negotiations, with the intention to shed light on the position of a country that – due to its geo-political collocation and its proximity to the Eastern European bloc – understood from the very beginning the potential opportunities of the détente, without underestimating its risks, and actively contributed in shaping the position of the West bloc and in particular of the European Community.

Despite its title, in Italy's perspective the document signed in Helsinki on August 1st 1975 was anything but final. It was rather a starting point of a process that needed to be ambitious but at the same time gradual in order to be successful. In the words of Italy's Prime Minister Aldo Moro in Helsinki, the Final Act was “a gateway to the future”.

In the context of today's complex international scenario, reviewing the political and diplomatic dynamics which shaped the event towards the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act and its aftermath provides inspiring reflections. 2025 marks the 50th anniversary of this key milestone in the history of international relations. Russia's unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine has shattered the foundations of the European security architecture. Nevertheless, the principles agreed on in Helsinki fifty years ago continue to be the polar star for security and cooperation in Europe. Upholding them will remain a crucial priority for ensuring peace and stability, not just in our Continent but globally.

LAMBERTO ZANNIER

PREFACE

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has dramatically exacerbated the crisis of the OSCE as the main instrument of cooperative security in Europe for the past 50 years. Yet the CSCE had been created as an instrument of dialogue between the opposing alliances during the Cold War, serving as a channel of communication and, possibly, of cooperation in a context of insecurity and potential instability, and therefore the OSCE should have served as an important channel of dialogue and crisis prevention in conflicts over the past decades.

These considerations are based on what I witnessed directly. Back in 1986, as a member of the Italian delegation to the CSCE Vienna Follow-up Meeting, I was assigned to follow the work of the “first basket” (Principles and Political-Military Security). I remember an intense schedule of daily meetings, often until late at night, lively debates, sometimes heated exchanges, leading to slow but continuous progress reflecting political developments in this final phase of the Cold War. As a result, a set of measures of confidence and security-building was adopted, demonstrating the importance of a space for dialogue and cooperation extended to all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. This difficult dialogue process, strongly supported by a far-sighted leadership, would eventually prove to be fundamental in managing the delicate transition after the end of the Cold War.

In 1990, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe embodied a new, shared vision, becoming a key element for the evolution of the CSCE and an opportunity for re-designing the European security architecture and relaunching the conference. Gorbachev's idea of establishing a “common European house” was taking shape, the principles of democratic coexistence strongly supported by the West were being reaffirmed, and a process of gradual institutionalization of the CSCE began with the creation of a number of specialized institutions and a Conflict

Prevention Centre that would shortly become part of a larger Secretariat structure, headed by a Secretary General.

During those years I observed the evolution of the CSCE from a different but very relevant perspective, that of NATO, in whose Secretariat I served between 1991 and 1997. Two remarks in this regard, both related to Russia. The first concerns Moscow's strong investment in the rebuilding of a dynamic of cooperation in the former Soviet space, with the launch of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), to which many of the successor countries of the USSR adhered, although not without mistrust and reservations, as I noted in the debates in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council attended by the former members of the Warsaw Pact and the successor States of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, Russia was exploring opportunities to deepen its relations with the West and, in particular, with NATO. In that decade, President Yeltsin and several successive foreign ministers explored the conditions for a deepening of mutual cooperation, supported by oligarchs who saw great opportunities in a closer relationship with the West. However, they called for a reform of NATO. Eventually, in their view, it could become a defense cooperation organization, also capable of assisting the UN in the conduct of peace operations. In addition, as a result of the debate on the 'out-of-area' use of the alliance's military capabilities, an ad hoc group on peacekeeping cooperation was established, operating for some years within the NATO Cooperation Council/PfP with the full participation of Russia.

At the same time, Russia argued for a profound transformation of the CSCE, with the adoption of a Charter that, once ratified by parliaments, would give it legal character and a coordinating role vis-à-vis other relevant European organizations (starting with NATO). During this time, relations between Russia and the West also remained constructive in the CSCE. Russia accepted the principle of 'consensus minus one', which circumvented the consensus rule - one of the foundations of the CSCE, which guarantees anyone a right of veto - in case of massive violations of the basic principles of the Helsinki Charter. Russia even concurred in its application to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, traditionally close to Russia itself. But the conflicts of the 1990s showed that in reality the geopolitical gap between Russia and the West had not

been closed. The lack of progress on a possible rapprochement between Russia and NATO ended up giving breath to those in Moscow who opposed Yeltsin's open line, ultimately contributing to Putin's rise and marking the beginning of a phase in which relations would become increasingly tense and competitive.

On the CSCE reform front, Russia's achievements were limited and superficial. Little changed apart from the name. Although the OSCE was recognized as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (the OSCE Secretary General regularly participated, together with the EU and NATO, in coordination meetings with regional organizations convened by the UN Secretary General), it did not acquire legal personality, to the extent that the participating countries were not even recognized as member states. And as a result, in 1997, it was Russia - which had previously fought to give the OSCE a strong role in peace-keeping operations, possibly even giving mandates to other organizations such as NATO - that rejected an Italian proposal to give an OSCE mandate to what was to become Operation Alba in Albania.

The Istanbul Summit in many ways marked the end of the phase in which an understanding between Russia and the West could have been reached. With the rise of Putin to the presidency of Russia, more visible symptoms of the geopolitical rift that would characterize the subsequent years in an increasingly marked manner, began to appear. The Astana Summit of 2010, the only event at the level of OSCE Heads of State and Government after Istanbul, did not succeed either in adopting a detailed plan of action, limiting itself to issuing a Declaration, which referred to the creation of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian community within the OSCE, however without operative recommendations.

An increasing divide among participating States was also taking place in relation to activities within the OSCE. The West had traditionally privileged the human dimension of the organization, with a view to promoting the principles, enshrined in the Paris Charter, of promoting stability and security by strengthening democratic institutions and guaranteeing citizens' fundamental freedoms. On the other side, Russia perceived EU and NATO enlargement towards the East as potentially damaging its security interests. Moscow pushed for a further development of the collaborative processes it had initiated in the Eurasian space, with the intention of establishing a zone of cooperation and progressive integration in an

area vital to its own security. Without effective dialogue, the OSCE was substantially losing some of its key prerogatives, in particular its capacity to work as an effective tool for early warning and confidence building. The risk of moving towards a new Yalta was real and had to be averted with greater commitment. The annexation of Crimea, conducted in open violation of the fundamental principles of international law, raised serious questions about the long-term sustainability of the arrangements that had emerged at the end of the Cold War.

The EU initially intended to manage the crisis possibly by deploying its own mission on the ground, similarly to what happened in Georgia after the conflict in 2008. The Ukrainian government openly welcomed this project, which would accelerate the process of rapprochement with Brussels. Yet, obstacles on the ground could not be ignored. The capture by separatist militiamen in the Donbass region of members of a mission to observe unusual military activities activated by the Ukrainian side under the OSCE Vienna Document in spring 2014, proved the need for a mission that could be acceptable to Russia and the Moscow-backed separatist forces. In consultation with the Swiss Chairmanship, consultations were held with all the parties concerned and the way was opened for the deployment of the Special Monitoring Mission, the largest observation operation run by the OSCE, and later the Russian-Ukrainian Border Observation Mission.

These missions, which employed civilian personnel with solid military experience, marked a significant evolution of the field mission model. The conflict in South-Eastern Ukraine was a significant example of the new type of hybrid conflicts that the international community would increasingly have to deal with in the future. Paramilitary groups, which had taken control of public buildings, police and broadcasting stations, had quickly equipped themselves with heavy weaponry and could rely on a constant supply of fuel and ammunition. The conflict gradually spread over the territory, with an obvious presence of foreign fighters, mostly Russian, but with no trace of Russian military formations as such. As the months passed, the separatists strengthened their control over local institutions, establishing local structures of self-government. Ultimately, the formula of an international civilian presence - as opposed to a hypothetical military peacekeeping force, which the Ukrainians would have preferred, but which could have led to

incidents with the separatists – proved to be adequate to allow for an objective – to the extent that it was possible, given the limitation of movement for observers – although not conclusive observation activity.

As in every conflict, the international community could play a facilitating role in understanding the situation on the ground and in mediating the settlement of the conflict (in this case, through the Minsk Agreements), but it could not replace the parties in the political dialogue for the resolution of the conflict. There also did not appear to be a clear understanding of the fact that the conflict was not really about the self-determination of Donbass, but rather about the future geopolitical positioning of Ukraine.

In the future, in-depth reflection will be needed on the effectiveness of crisis prevention and management, investing more in political analysis and prevention tools and improving the mechanisms for investigating humanitarian crimes. The ultimate limitation remains the reluctance of national governments to accept a stronger role for multilateral structures in following up early warning signals, as they see in this the risk of a cession of sovereignty. However, it is precisely in this direction that we need to move.

There is a real risk of a re-armament race and a gradual erosion of nuclear disarmament agreements. And this in a context in which the instruments developed during the Cold War to strengthen confidence, ensure transparency and predictability in the military field and limit conventional weaponry endowments no longer function effectively and there is no room for initiatives to revitalize them, despite the fact that they are now more necessary than ever.

In today's climate of growing antagonism and conflict, efforts to revive the cooperative method are needed more than ever. This can only be achieved through the careful balancing of strengthened multilateralism and strong political leadership. I hope we can achieve a declaration to this effect by the Heads of State and Government of all OSCE area countries, in view of the 50th Anniversary of the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act. It is undeniable that the return to geopolitics is reducing the space for cooperative policies. However, we cannot attribute the difficulty of dialogue to the inefficiency of the security structures that we have developed over the years, which must instead be preserved and strengthened. In order to restore security and reinforce stability in

Europe through dialogue and cooperation, a more determined collective effort is needed now more than ever to keep dialogue and channels of communication open, enhancing consensus-based working methods and inclusive structures such as those of the OSCE. This is the necessary precondition for trying to overcome the new divisions and re-establish the fundamental principles and rules that make international relations more structured, stable and predictable.

PART 1

ITALY, THE PATH TOWARDS HELSINKI AND BEYOND: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

LUCIANO MONZALI

ITALY'S POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE
IN THE AGE OF DÉTENTE

The emergence of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, known as the Cold War, led to a progressive and dramatic political and economic isolation of the countries allied with and friendly to the Soviet Union from the rest of Europe. This separation and isolation were certainly not desired by Italy, which always rejected the division of Europe into two opposing and separate blocs as a permanent condition. Starting in the late 1950s, through a determined effort to intensify bilateral relations with the countries of the Eastern Bloc (the so-called Italian *Ostpolitik*), Italy worked to keep alive a pan-European perspective, emphasizing the cultural and economic unity of European nations.

Particularly from the late 1950s onward, as the slow development of détente between the Soviet Union and the Western Bloc created a favorable international context, Italy – keen to be one of the leaders in the détente process – renewed its efforts to strengthen political, cultural, and economic relations with the Soviet Union and other communist European countries. It attached great importance to organizing state visits as a key tool of its *Ostpolitik*.

The Italian *Ostpolitik* proved effective and achieved tangible results. Italy, alongside West Germany, became the main Western trading partner of the communist bloc countries, and cultural relations between Italy and the communist nations also intensified.

When analyzing the characteristics of the Italian *Ostpolitik*, it is important to highlight the plurality of its actors and stakeholders – diplomats, entrepreneurs, and politicians – who often had multiple, differing, and even conflicting motivations and objectives. These included the belief in a shared cultural unity across the European continent and the idea that Europe constituted a single geopolitical space stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. There was also the conviction that Italy would

reap significant economic and political benefits from strengthening relations with the communist bloc, and the calculation that an active Eastern policy would help Italy regain greater international autonomy and importance.

Diplomacy played a leading role in formulating and implementing the Italian *Ostpolitik*. Ambassadors such as Luca Pietromarchi, Enrico Aillaud, and Roberto Ducci were deeply committed to improving relations with the communist countries of Europe during the 1950s, the 1960s and 1970s. However, the motivations and foreign policy visions that underpinned the support of many diplomats for détente with the Soviet Union and the communist European countries were diverse. For example, Pietromarchi saw détente between the blocs as an opportunity for Italy to strengthen its international influence. In contrast, Pietro Quaroni believed that the Italian *Ostpolitik* should aim to weaken Soviet hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe and, in particular, to encourage smaller communist states to become more autonomous and independent from Moscow.

Economic motivations—particularly the desire to sell Italian goods and products to the Soviets and communist countries, given the highly advantageous terms for Italian companies—were naturally the primary reason for the strong support from Italian business circles for improved relations with the USSR. Large state-owned and private companies (such as ENI, IRI, FIAT, etc.), led by ambitious and shrewd executives like Enrico Mattei and Vittorio Valletta, were at the forefront of efforts to intensify commercial relations with the markets of communist Europe. Their contracts and agreements often paved the way for initiatives by politicians and diplomats.

The motivations of Italian politicians were more varied. On the domestic front, good relations with the Soviet Union and the communist countries were highly useful: they undermined the anti-Western and anti-Atlantic propaganda of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) by demonstrating Italy's openness and friendship toward the communist bloc. There was also hope that such relations might weaken the close ties between the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the USSR, reducing Moscow's interest in interfering in Italian domestic politics by presenting Italy as a non-hostile power.

Moreover, figures such as Pietro Nenni, Amintore Fanfani, Giorgio La Pira, Giulio Andreotti, and Aldo Moro were driven by strong idealistic motivations, believing in international cooperation and the cultural unity of the European continent.

Italy's response to the division of Europe was varied and complex, but many held a strong conviction that the resumption of cultural and economic relations with the Soviet Union and European communist states was a valuable and essential element, serving as a preliminary phase for political rapprochement between the two blocs. Furthermore, they believed that the establishment of a set of conduct rules for states, as sanctioned in the Helsinki Final Act, could inaugurate a period of peaceful coexistence among European nations, potentially fostering reform processes within Communist Europe.

The Italian *Ostpolitik* witnessed an intensification from the end of the 1960s. Aside from Italy's ambitions to play a more autonomous and decisive role in the international context, a key element in strengthening the action of Rome towards the communist European countries was the emerging diplomatic and political rapprochement between the USA and the USSR, testified by the Non-Proliferation Treaty signed on 1st July 1968. The Nixon Administration pushed further the rapprochement with Moscow, as testified by the agreements signed in Moscow in May 1972. Undoubtedly, the stimulus provided by West Germany's initiatives regarding the agreements with the USSR and Poland in 1970, also had a crucial impact on the Italian *Ostpolitik*. The Soviet proposal for a European conference on security, presented in March 1966, had provoked sensation and concern, with the effect of spurring a wide discussion in the Western bloc, and in particular in Italy, about the opportunity to start negotiations on principles for coexistence among European States. In this respect, developments in the domestic political situation were nurturing the debate, above all the strategy to include the communist vote in a wider governmental area in order to introduce it into the Italian political dynamics.

The Italian top diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were particularly keen to exploit the opportunities for Italy's foreign policy disclosed by the détente, in particular Roberto Gaja, Director General for political affairs from 1964 to 1969 and then Secretary General from

1970 to 1975, and Roberto Ducci, Director for political affairs from 1970 to 1975.

Roberto Gaja was firmly pro-NATO but aspired to see Italy playing a leading role in the European politics. He considered positively the emerging détente process, which could lead to a new world order based no longer on competition but rather on cooperation among nuclear powers so as to create a network of common interests that would have eventually prevented the use of force in the international relations. According to Gaja, the creation of a new international system based on the cooperation between the USA and the USSR would not have impeded the development of smaller nuclear powers, nor “a wider action of local powers, although within well-defined limits”. It was within this space that a more dynamic and ambitious Italian foreign policy could develop, not just in Europe and in the Mediterranean but also on a global scale, capable of exploiting the benefits of the international cooperation, the détente and the alliance with the USA.

Roberto Ducci, former Ambassador to Belgrade and Vienna, had an overall vision similar to Gaja but with a different political and ideological sensibility. While for Gaja, NATO and the relations with the United States were of crucial importance, during the 1970s, Ducci’s ambition was to place the European integration process at the heart of Italy’s foreign policy, with the goal of creating a more united and integrated Europe that should have eventually emancipated itself from the USA – a more unpredictable and unilateralist player under the Nixon Administration – and been capable of opposing the Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe. According to Ducci, the détente process between the two blocs, the new *Ostpolitik* of West Germany, the slow rise of the People’s Republic of China and India were all factors for deep changes of the equilibria that emerged after World War II.

The Italian political leadership interacted synergically with the diplomatic thinking. Aldo Moro (Prime Minister from 1963 to 1968 and from 1974 to 1976; Minister of foreign affairs from 1969 to 1972 and from 1973 to 1974) strongly believed that the détente process in Europe represented a vital interest of Italy. According to Moro, the détente was a gradual process to be developed in two phases. A first phase should have led to a rapprochement between the two political systems. The second phase should have worked on the root causes that have

determined the rise of the two blocs, but “without generating confusion, without generating disequilibrium, aiming on the contrary to an effective peace framework and letting the traditional alliances and communities of interest and values free to operate and expand”. Moro considered the European political landscape not as static but rather as a changing system with a plurality of actors. In this context, Italy should have been an active player. However, he presented the Italian *Ostpolitik* mainly as a factor for stabilization of the European status quo, that would not threaten the interests of the Soviet Union and of the international communism. Moro considered as a fundamental condition for improving the relations with communist countries the reciprocal acceptance “of the complex – political and not only territorial – realities that represent the connective tissue of today’s Europe”. Certainly, for Moro the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms by all European states was key for the success of the détente process. Could such an emphasis be coherent with the idea of signing bilateral treaties with communist regimes oppressing their citizens? For Moro the answer was positive because he thought that the détente would have favored the liberalization process within these regimes and ultimately strengthened the moderate voices inside the communist parties.

Giulio Andreotti (Prime Minister from 1972 to 1973; from 1976 to 1979 and from 1989 to 1992; Minister of foreign affairs from 1983 to 1989) was a firm supporter of the détente process, considering a top priority for Italy the quest for peace through socio-economic development, as well as the achievement of security guarantees. For Andreotti it was crucial to realize the CSCE and to intensify the relations with the USSR and the Eastern European countries in order to favor a fruitful coexistence among all peoples of the European continent, based on the full respect of the independence of the states and human rights. The East-West Dialogue could hopefully determine a reduction of military expenditures and a safeguard of international equilibria, as well as an improvement in the relations among European peoples.

In this context, improving relations with the Soviet Union was of central importance. The Italian government placed significant emphasis on human rights but preferred to avoid excessive interference in the internal affairs of states. It saw the role of the CSCE as enhancing tangible collective security and promoting pan-European economic, cultural, and

human cooperation. For Italy, collaboration with the Soviet Union was paramount in achieving peace in Europe based on a balance of power.

On October 26, 1972, the Italian government and the Soviets signed a bilateral consultation protocol and a treaty on merchant navigation. The protocol proclaimed that "in the desire to strengthen and develop the relations of friendship and mutual trust between the peoples of Italy and the Soviet Union, inspired by a shared desire to collaborate in maintaining international peace and security, implementing the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, noting the steady expansion of relations between the two countries and considering it useful to raise cooperation to a higher level in all fields, including the political sphere," the two states agreed to intensify "their consultations on major international issues of common interest and on matters concerning their bilateral relations" (Article 1). Through these consultations, Italy and the Soviet Union aimed to promote further collaboration and relations to improve the international situation, make progress toward disarmament, and consolidate détente and security in Europe (Article 2). These consultations could address international issues causing tensions in different parts of the world, matters of common interest discussed within international organizations of which both countries were members, as well as any other topic on which the parties deemed it useful to exchange views (Article 3). If a situation arose that, in the judgment of both parties, posed a threat to or breach of peace, or could lead to dangerous international complications, the Italian and Soviet governments would "promptly establish contact and seek mutual understanding on what might be done to improve the situation" (Article 4). The protocol's provisions would in no way affect the international obligations previously undertaken by the parties in agreements to which they were signatories, nor were they intended to prejudice any third state (Article 5). Consultations were to be held regularly on dates mutually agreed upon and conducted at various levels, while consultations between foreign ministers or their representatives were to occur "in principle, twice a year and whenever necessary" (Article 6).

The significance of the consultation protocol in the history of Italian foreign policy cannot be underestimated. It marked a turning point in bilateral relations between Rome and Moscow, which became more cordial and intense than ever before. In his memoirs, Andrei Gromyko, the

Soviet minister of foreign affairs, described the 1972 Protocol as a document that "embodied the desire of the two countries to elevate relations in all fields, including the political sphere, to a higher level."

To many center-left politicians, including Andreotti, the Soviet Union ceased to be seen as an adversary and instead became an international partner for interaction and dialogue, one from which significant economic and political benefits could be derived¹. Exchanges of views and meetings between the two diplomacies became more frequent and amicable. Trade relations also saw a qualitative leap, intensifying significantly. Just a few months after Andreotti's visit and the establishment of a political foundation for bilateral relations, an Italian-Soviet economic cooperation agreement was signed in May 1973. Over the following years, this collaboration deepened, with Italy increasingly acquiring energy resources from the Soviet Union, while Moscow made substantial purchases of Italian goods and manufactured products.

¹ In 1984 as Minister of foreign affairs, Andreotti referred to the Italian parliament about the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in the following terms: "It is a fact, that we must accept as such, that for historical and psychological reasons Soviets put the bar of their security at a level objectively very high, while for Westerners the balance of forces is rightly the fundamental criterion of every agreement on disarmament. The result is that what is considered security by the Soviets is military superiority for us and – by contrast – Soviets consider as a threat what we consider balance. [...] this contradiction must be overcome: it is a difficult task but it is not impossible. A first step could come from the security and confidence building measures, which are the scope of the Conference on disarmament in Europe."

FEDERICO IMPERATO

ITALY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL ACT
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION
IN EUROPE

The Soviet project to hold a conference on the problems of security and cooperation in Europe, dating back to 1954, found increasing attention within the Italian government and diplomacy starting from the 1960s, thanks to the political action of Amintore Fanfani, Aldo Moro, and Pietro Nenni. Started in the 1960s with the center-left governments and continued in the 1970s with the so-called “strategy of attention” towards the communists pursued above all by Moro, the opening to the left parties made the Italian governments of the time more receptive to the requests coming from the Soviet bloc countries.

After the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, with its repercussions within the Italian political framework, the East-West contrast took on a different profile: the model of Soviet Socialism was openly questioned even within the Eastern bloc. At the same time, détente seemed to take on a permanent character. On the other hand, precisely in the period 1968-69, the protest known as the “hot autumn”, as well as the student protest – with the rejection of the war in Vietnam – were animated by a strong hostility against the United States, which counterbalanced the criticisms of the USSR.

While the opposition’s campaign against NATO was evanescent – the renewal to the twenty-year deadline in 1969 took place by tacit consensus – the project of a European conference gained attention. Until then, the Soviet (or Polish) invitations to convene a “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe”, formulated several times, had not been taken into serious consideration by the West.

During the talks with Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani in Rome, in April 1966, Andrei Gromyko illustrated the project, finding a favourable response. Fanfani spoke for it at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels on 7 June 1966, considering it an idea “that deserves careful

consideration". In the various contacts developed with other European countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany), the favourable Italian attitude was innovative. Fanfani introduced the argument of the need to "prepare carefully" for a conference, in a speech at the Chamber of Deputies on 11 July 1966.

The different positions about the Conference, expressed within the Italian government by Prime Minister Moro – more cautious – and Fanfani, reveal both the different personalities of the two leaders of the Christian Democratic Party and the visions that do not perfectly coincide on foreign policy and Italy's international role. Fanfani's return to the helm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opened new horizons to the external relations of Rome's government. Fanfani wanted to give Italian foreign policy a global perspective, trying to make national diplomacy a protagonist of mediation in the most serious international crises of the period. This global presence of Italy, in some cases oversized compared to the dimension and strategic and political importance of this country, a medium regional power, was viewed with suspicion and distrust by US political and diplomatic circles, ready to identify it exclusively with Fanfani's personal ambitions. He had the ambition of returning either to the helm of the government or as leader of the Christian Democratic Party, also winking at the election of the Head of State, which would be held in 1971, at the end of the seven-year term of the Social-Democratic leader Giuseppe Saragat.

However, it would be unfair to declassify Fanfani's international action as Foreign Minister in the centre-left governments as a pure reflection of his ambitions. The foreign policy of the Christian Democrat politician also responded to very strong value-rooted ideas, which can be identified in the Catholic Church after the Second Vatican Council and in the friendship that linked him to Giorgio La Pira, mayor of Florence in the 1950s. The action of Enrico Mattei's ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, Italy's national energy company) constituted the third inspiring element of Fanfani's vision and political action, in the field of economy and energy, in this case. Against this background, the Soviets floated their proposal for a conference on security in Europe.

Conceived by the Soviets as a place for discussion from which issues such as military forces and armaments would be excluded, the conference aimed to obtain international recognition of the territorial and

political status quo established in Europe after the Second World War and to create the conditions for a new European security system. This explains the initial reaction of the USA, under the Republican Administration of Richard Nixon, that considered the proposal as a trap, conditioning its acceptance to eventual progress on the topic of arms control. However, such concerns were not shared by the European allies of Washington, just like USSR satellite countries of the Warsaw Pact, that regarded the CSCE as an opportunity to de-militarize the rivalry between the West and East and to affirm their specific interest through multilateral negotiations that would have reduced the influence of the super powers.

Thus, as far as the Italian case was concerned within the process that would lead to the convening of the CSCE, various axes of Rome's foreign policy began to intertwine, which involved either the question of the relations between East and West, as well as the dimension of security and disarmament, that of human rights, and the need to settle the border and territorial disputes still open with neighbouring countries, Austria and Yugoslavia in particular. In this sense, we can apply to the process that would lead to the CSCE and the Helsinki Final Act the same stimuli that Luciano Monzali identifies in tracing the reasons and arguments that were at the basis of the Italian *Ostpolitik*: a plurality of acting subjects, bearers of different objectives, which gave a complex but disorganized character to the deepening of the dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe.

First of all, there was an economic motivation, given by the possibility of penetration into new markets, to push private and State companies – from ENI to IRI to FIAT – to ask to intensify commercial relations with the countries of communist Europe. However, from a political perspective, there was a push to progressively weaken the close relationship existing between Moscow and the Italian Communist Party (PCI). This could eventually undermine arguments from the PCI's anti-Western and anti-NATO propaganda and diminish Moscow's interest in trying to influence Italian politics through the PCI party. In addition to this, there certainly existed a common ideal root, which more or less partially shared the thoughts and political actions of the main leaders of the centre-left, such as Fanfani, Moro and the Socialist Pietro Nenni. They firmly believed in international cooperation and the cultural unity

of the European continent. Similar considerations, although perhaps inspired more by elements of *realpolitik*, came from diplomatic circles. Personalities such as Luca Pietromarchi, Roberto Gaja, Roberto Ducci, and Pietro Quaroni believed that *détente* could become, for Italy, an opportunity to strengthen its international weight, enhancing its geopolitical role as a hinge country between the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and Central Europe. At the same time, this could lead to a reduction in Soviet influence in European politics.

The starting point of this political path is to be found in the extraordinary NATO Ministerial meeting held on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Alliance, on 10-11 April 1969 in Washington. Faced with the indifference of others, Foreign Minister Nenni hoped for “a direct negotiation between East and West” and introduced some new concepts developed by the Italian Foreign Ministry: a security system can only be achieved by “stages”; “gradual and collective agreements for the suppression of arbitrary obstacles placed on human relations” were appropriate; “a Western bid for an East-West conference would be the best answer.” Italy strongly supported to officially accept the idea of a European conference. Some results were obtained in the form of a general willingness to explore these themes, as mentioned by the final communiqué of the meeting in Washington.

It appears clear that, on the part of the Italian Socialist leader, the Soviet offer of collaboration in European cooperation and security was a useful assist – or perhaps even a pretext – to change the elements of Italian membership in the same Atlantic Alliance, which the Italian Socialist Party, after years of convinced and rigid neutralism, had agreed to recognize in exchange for its entry into the government majority. It could be transformed “from a predominantly military organization into a predominantly political organization, with tasks not only of coexistence but of collaboration between the West and the East”.

Nenni’s merit was above all to have allowed the opening of a discussion within the Western chancelleries on the issue of the European security, that started to become an unavoidable topic in the debate and documents of foreign policy of the old Continent’s Nations. In those same days, in fact, the government of Finland sent to all European countries (as well as to the US and Canada) a note in which, by supporting

without preconditions the organization of the conference, it offered to host the preliminary discussion and the conference itself in Helsinki.

Nenni's successor at the helm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, starting from 1969, was Aldo Moro. Moro's actions could count on various strengths. First of all, he understood very well the close relationship and the close interdependence existing between internal politics and foreign policy, which are even more valid for a country like Italy, because of its geopolitical and strategic position, and in the historical phase of *détente*, in which attempts were made to redefine the relationships between powers and blocs which, until that moment, had acted in almost purely conflictual terms and as opposed political and ideological fields. Moro was the architect of the dialogue with Enrico Berlinguer's PCI through the so-called "strategy of attention".

The arrival of Aldo Moro at the helm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also brought new impetus to Italian action regarding European security and cooperation policy. The ideas on which Italian diplomacy would operate were presented by Moro at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies in late 1969. Moro underlined those countries such as the USA and Canada – "firmly tied to Europe" – should not have been excluded from this negotiation, therefore, precisely because the conference would have dealt with issues of global balance, the conference had to be "adequately prepared" and managed "with realism and prudence, but as well as with serious political will". Moro concluded focusing once again on the notion of "graduality", considering it indispensable "if the goal is to reach a just peace in Europe and not simply the organization of a conference, without reasonable possibility of success". These themes are referred to in the communiqué of the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels on 5 December 1969. For the first time, the Atlantic Alliance adopted the term "conference" with "thorough" preparation. The Italian expression that "*détente* has no alternatives" gained consensus. At the meeting, Moro introduced the position that would characterize Italy's standing in the preparatory phases of the CSCE. The conference should have represented the apex of the ongoing *détente* process, the conclusion of a "great negotiation", to be carried forward through a number of steps, both bilateral and multilateral, which would not result just in the adoption of confidence building measures. According to Moro, the conference should have assumed a

dynamic and flexible character and not enclose itself in the static nature in which the Soviet conception of European security would have wanted to cage it, aimed exclusively at “the consolidation of the territorial and political status quo”.

What characterized and distinguished the Italian position from the other Western countries was the underlining of the two necessary pre-conditions to effectively complete the work of a European conference: the conclusion of the negotiations for the enlargement of the Community to Great Britain, and of the negotiations on the German situation and Berlin. In fact, in the CSCE process, several lines of Italian foreign policy were intertwined: from the political question of East-West relations to the dimension of security, disarmament, and human rights. Italy had the opportunity to carry out significant action at the CSCE, both on the issues of the free movement of people, ideas, and information (part of the so-called “third basket”), and the inviolability of borders, which was not to be interpreted in a static manner, but intended to consolidate the dynamic character of East-West relations.

During the first stage of the Helsinki process, from November 1972 to June 1973, the Italian delegation engaged above all in the definition of those principles relating to contacts between people, the diffusion of information, collaboration in the field of culture and education: ultimately, those principles that would define, within the Final Act, the so-called “third basket”.

Once the preliminary session was over, the work of the actual Conference was organized into three phases. The first was held in Helsinki, from 3 to 7 July 1973, and led to the solemn approval of the results of the laborious negotiations of the preliminary consultations. The subsequent preparatory phase in Geneva, from September 1973 to July 1975, and the actual conference, from 30 July to 1 August 1975, ended with the solemn signature of the Helsinki Final Act, which Moro – having returned in November 1974 to the head of the Italian government – also signed on behalf of the European Community.

From the beginning, Italy carried out a significant action as introducer of the most controversial part of the Final Act, which related to the free circulation of people, ideas, and information (the “third basket”). Furthermore, Rome insisted on the notion of inviolability of the borders. Rather than having a new autonomous formulation, this

principle should have derived from the renunciation of the use of force or of the threat to use force, considering unacceptable a formulation of norms of international law specific for the European context. Therefore, Italy was reluctant to attribute a central place to the principle of inviolability of the borders, as the Soviets wished, in order not to grant a *droit de regard* to the USSR in Europe so as to prevent a possible continental reunification. The Italian delegation strongly advocated for the principle of self-determination and self-decision of domestic political systems, as well as for the interdependent nature of all principles, in order to avoid that the principle of non-interference in internal affairs should jeopardize the safeguard of human rights. Therefore, the consolidation of the dynamic character of East-West relations was the Italian objective in the development of the “third basket”. The inclusion of a Mediterranean dimension was achieved with the invitation, under the title of “non-participating countries”, to the coastal States of the Mediterranean (Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Israel accepted) and with the draft declaration on the Mediterranean, prepared with great diplomatic care and incorporated into the final text.

The action of the Italian representatives was followed in Italy with little interest, even if it led to moments of tension with the USSR, contrary to the insistence on the dynamic character of the CSCE and on the measures on civil and human rights as indispensable conditions of a *détente* destined to substantially modify East-West relations.

The conclusions reached in the framework of the “third basket” in particular, according to which human rights derived from the dignity of the human person and were not privileges granted by the State and the respect for the same rights and their concrete applications were essential factors for peace, summarized Moro’s firm convictions that *détente* was a process that did not end in a conference or by signing a document, but had to be based on the consensus of the people. In this sense, as Moro said in his statement in Helsinki on 30 July 1975, the Conference would not constitute a terminal point, but a transit towards the future, which the protagonists were carrying out with a realistic spirit, aware of the weight exerted by the ideological differences and respective political, economic and social structures. The validity of that multilateral dialogue, of which the Conference constituted a basic but not definitive

moment, had to be measured by the ability to meet the expectations of the peoples and, in particular, of the new generations.

FABIO BETTANIN

MOSCOW AND THE CSCE

For half a century, different interpretations have swirled around the Helsinki Final Act, in Western countries and in Russia. Undoubtedly, the "Helsinki process" was a central point of reference for Soviet foreign policy before and after its signature.

Since 1954 the Soviet Union had been pressing for various versions of a "European Security Conference", with the goal of obtaining from NATO countries the recognition of the post-war borders and the promise of Germany's non-membership to NATO. In the long run, the Kremlin's aim was to exclude the United States from a new European security system which they expected to dominate. The changes in the international order soon made Soviet plans outdated. The accession of West Germany to NATO and the hydrogen bomb changed the terms of the German question: thereafter, the main objective of Soviet diplomacy was to prevent West Germany's nuclear rearmament. The schism of Tito's Yugoslavia and the effects of de-Stalinization in the countries of Eastern Europe, culminating in the double invasion of Hungary in October-November 1956, forced the Soviet leaders to realize that social fragility and lack of legitimacy of the regimes were the real threat to the cohesion of the socialist bloc. At the end of the decade, the second Berlin crisis, engineered by Khrushchev with the aim of solving the German question by negotiating from a position of strength, ended up opening the Pandora's box of unresolved questions of Soviet foreign policy: the state of inferiority of East Germany compared to its Western counterpart; the asymmetries inside the bipolar world; the lack of cohesion of the "socialist bloc"; the separation with Communist China; the divisions within the Soviet leadership. Attempts to resolve them with improvised initiatives in domestic and international politics led to Khrushchev's dismissal in October 1964.

The first objective of his successors was to restore the USSR's role of reliable interlocutor in a bipolar world deeply transformed. Soviet

society as well had changed. After the war, 70 million people were born with no direct experience of Stalinism. They were better educated than the previous generation, considered the USSR's status as a great power as a given, and looked at the West with mixed feelings: of fear, but also of envy and admiration, and even of hope for convergence. Even the socialist bloc was not the monolith described in the West and, in the mid-Sixties, it was divided into an economy-oriented sub-bloc (Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) and a security-concerned sub-bloc (East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia). In 1965, the start of negotiations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) gave concrete substance to the formula of "peaceful coexistence", for the first time used by Malenkov in 1954. In the years of détente, Soviet diplomacy followed a more realistic assessment of the role of the United States in Europe: only the US administration had the power to convince West Germany to join the NPT. In this context, the turning point was the 8-month experience known as the Prague Spring, ending on 21 August 1968 by the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops. Unlike what happened to Khrushchev with Hungary, Brezhnev came out with the image of a statesman who had managed to circumscribe the negative effects of the crisis, both in the USSR and abroad, and was able to proclaim a doctrine, whose basic thesis was simple: the invasion had been imposed by the "internationalist duty" to protect the socialist system from the spread of the "peaceful counter-revolution underway in Prague". From then on, Soviet foreign policy was again in the hands of a single leader, even if the methods used by Brezhnev, open to the opinions of the other members of the *Politburo*, were far from Khrushchev's "subjectivism".

The novelty of the situation was conveyed in March 1969 by the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact, which ended with the formation of a Committee of Foreign Ministers of its members, along with the NATO model, and with the reinforcement of the powers of the Supreme Military Commander. After years of attempts, the military and political profile of the Warsaw Pact were such to make it a reliable interlocutor of Western institutions and also a Forum that allowed member countries to express themselves with some degree of autonomy. This allowed the Kremlin to put forward the proposal of a conference of European countries for "security and peaceful cooperation", to which the USA were also invited.

The démarche was addressed to a Western world that agreed in condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but was disunited in assessing its consequences. In West Germany, the process of reconsidering *Ostpolitik* had already begun before 1968 and after the invasion of Czechoslovakia had resulted in the opening of a "secret channel" between the new German government led by the social democrat Brandt and the Kremlin. On the German side, the responsibility for the negotiations was entrusted to Egon Bahr, the main architect of the *Ostpolitik*. The choice confirmed to the Kremlin that the relations with Russia were a priority of German foreign policy. The secrecy of the negotiations was essential in finding a diplomatic formula that would reconcile the opposing principles of the inviolability of borders and the right of peoples to self-determination. In February 1970, Bahr proposed to break the deadlock with a unilateral declaration in which West Germany stated its aim to achieve the unification of the country by peaceful means, while recognizing the legitimate existence of East Germany. After many refusals, the Soviet Minister of foreign affairs Gromyko agreed to the inclusion in the Treaty between the USSR and Germany of the "letter on German unification" as a "secret non-paper", of which the Soviet governing bodies and the GDR government were in fact informed.

The symbolic significance of the Treaty, like the subsequent ones between West Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Status Agreement, went beyond the concrete value of their clauses. Contrary to what had happened many times in the past, secret bilateral negotiations had created the conditions for strengthening the fragile network of multilateral relations. In December 1971 the NATO Council proposed an agenda for the conference, which included, in addition to security issues, others related to humanitarian aspects. The following month, the Warsaw Pact CCP replied with a counter-proposal in which were set out the seven principles on which European security was to be founded: inviolability of borders, renunciation of force, peaceful coexistence, equality between states, non-interference, mutually beneficial relations, disarmament. There was no mention of humanitarian issues, and as far as economic relations were concerned, the document limited itself to calling for the elimination of trade discrimination. A final paragraph included the proposal for the formation of a permanent body, to which the states concerned would entrust "joint work on the next steps

to be taken". In November 1972, in Dipoli, a suburb of Helsinki, representatives of 33 states began consultations to establish the agenda of the conference; at the same time, after Kissinger's mission to Moscow, security talks began in Vienna in January 1973 between the US and the USSR. The two working tracks of the negotiations were not the best solution for European countries. However, the awareness that the "Helsinki process" was a watershed in the history of the Cold dispelled any reservation.

As for a long part of its history, the Soviet diplomacy overestimated its strengths and approached the first phase of negotiations in the belief that it could negotiate from advantageous positions. At the basis of what has been called the "Gromyko-Kovalëv doctrine", but was in fact a new "Brezhnev doctrine", lay the vision that Western countries were forced by the difficult social and economic moment to recognize the role of the USSR as the main guarantor of peace and security in Europe. Expectations were soon dashed, and it took two years of tense negotiations to reach the signing of the Final Act on 1 August 1975. After an initial moment of disorientation and internal division, Soviet diplomats showed professionalism and a spirit of cooperation, but on several occasions only thanks to Brezhnev's personal interventions the Soviet delegation was able to overcome stalemates on the most controversial points: borders and human rights. In February 1975, Kissinger persuaded Gromyko to refrain from adding the adverb "only" to the wording that would later appear in the first principle of the Final Act: "borders may change in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement". By the third principle, borders remained "invulnerable (*nerušimye*)". The diplomatic defeat was undoubted. Less than five years earlier, the Kremlin had refused to make public Bahr's *non-paper* on the unification of Germany. In the Final Act, all European states, except Albania, recognized, in principle, the possibility of changing borders, even if there were no shared international rules on the procedures in this regard. After reaching the agreement on the borders, the head of the Soviet delegation Kovalëv agreed to sign the "third basket" on human rights, certainly after having received the green light from Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Andropov. The question about the real intention of the Soviet leaders to respect the undertaken commitments is rhetorical: the negative answer is obvious. Implementing the provisions of

the third basket would have required the rewriting of laws and codes: a work of years that went beyond the intentions and abilities of the Soviet leaders. To promote “the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other freedoms and rights that all derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”, as the seventh paragraph of the “first basket” asked, would have imposed an even higher price: the revision of the paradigms of “developed socialism”.

After the signing of the Final Act, the confrontation over the wording was immediately replaced by a struggle over its interpretation and implementation. The Kremlin's decision to celebrate it as the completion of the Second World War silenced internal conflicts, but offered to many Western statesmen and commentators the pretext to attack it as a sell-out akin to a “betrayal of Yalta”. Later, with the benefit of hindsight, it was judged a Western success because of the encouragement it gave to opposition in the Soviet bloc. Today the principal debate is about how much it contributed to ending the Cold War. As many scholars have observed, the Final Act, in promulgating a common concept of legitimacy for all of Europe, independent of political systems, went in the opposite direction to the division of the continent into blocs, and to find its precedents, one must go back to the great treaties that have marked the history of the continent: Westphalia in 1648, Utrecht in 1713, Vienna in 1815, and Paris in 1919. From this perspective, the “second basket”, the economic and environmental dimension, did not meet the expectations of the historical moment as it failed to set the task of overcoming the entropy of planned economies of the socialist bloc, heavily dependent on the capitalist economies of the countries of Western Europe, which in turn had entered a phase of crisis after the oil shock of 1973. The even more vague security commitments revealed their uselessness when the USSR decided to install the new SS20 missiles in the heart of Europe. The absence of institutionalization prevented the problems from being addressed in an organic way, and condemned subsequent meetings of the CSCE to a sterile discussion on human rights.

At the end of the decade, the wave of strikes in Poland that followed the drastic increase in the prices of consumer goods and the birth of *Solidarność*, surprised the Soviet leadership, absorbed by the problems of the war in Afghanistan and by the boycott of the Moscow Olympics,

and forced it to reconsider international political strategies in a more profound way than in 1956 and 1968. Until the proclamation of martial law in December 1981, none of the members of the *Politburo* demanded a military intervention in Poland, and this meant an implicit farewell to the “Brezhnev doctrine”. Economic considerations were decisive. The crisis did not come suddenly; already in 1970 and 1976 drastic increases in consumer goods prices had aroused popular revolts in Poland. The *Politburo* of the CPSU had accused the choice of the Polish leadership to focus on exports to capitalist countries, forgetting that the second basket of the *Final Act* had legitimized it, and that the same practices allowed the Soviet economy to avoid recession. The large crowds that welcomed John Paul II on a visit to Poland in June 1979 forced the Soviet leaders to change their mind about the international role of the Vatican, which had been condescendingly considered during the Helsinki process. The role played by *Solidarność*, under the leadership of the charismatic Lech Wałęsa, did not erase the importance of the “third basket”, but projected the debate on human rights towards the search of a political alternative to socialist regimes. Although no one in the *Politburo* raised the issue, all three Helsinki “baskets” had been called into question. All the great treaties of the past had required an adaptation to reality, which the signatories of the *Final Act* were unable to implement. The outcome was its loss of centrality in international relations.

Gorbachev's self-definition as a “product and anti-product of the system” synthesises the complexity of the historical moment at the time of its election as leader of the CPSU. His political career had begun in a climate of great expectations and disappointment over Khrushchev's ill-conceived reforms, and had continued in the intellectual mediocrity of the Brezhnev years. From this experience, he had retained common traits with the generation of the *šestidesjatniki*, the men of the sixties, among whom he chose his closest collaborators: optimism about the fate of the country; awareness of the country's backwardness vis-à-vis the West; faith in socialism, associated with annoyance at the emptiness of official ideological formulas. His political message, entrusted to metaphors devoid of a precise and stable content, such as acceleration (*uskorenie*), *glasnost'*, *perestroika*, Common European Home, expressed the choice to get rid of the past without explicitly repudiating it, relying on a long-term process of transformation. In line with this vision, in July

1989, in his speech at the Council of Europe, Gorbachev considered the documents approved at the CSCE meetings in Stockholm and Vienna as “the most complete expression of the political culture and moral traditions of the European peoples” and spoke of the “need for a second conference on the Helsinki model”, not only to consolidate security, but to move towards a “European community of the twenty-first century”.

There was no Helsinki II. Not because of the internal resistance in the USSR, which was weak on this point, nor because of the Bush administration's never-ending distrust of Gorbachev, which did not stop the openings of the European chancelleries. Simply, the events ran faster than *perestrojka's* projects. While Gorbachev was calling for a Helsinki II, the Hungarian communist reformist Németh had already decided to allow the citizens of East Germany to cross into West Germany without formalities, making the Wall useless; the POUP had suffered a devastating defeat in the political elections in Poland and everywhere, including the USSR, plans for a rapid transition to the market were discussed. Brezhnev had not recognized the importance of human rights due to cultural limitations and political calculation. Gorbachev understood their importance when reality had gone far beyond what he was willing and able to do, at home and in the countries of what was no longer a bloc even before the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR.

A lot has changed since then. The *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*, signed by the CSCE countries in November 1990, reaffirmed “the continued validity of the Ten Principles and our determination to put them into practice” projecting this commitment into an indeterminate future that never came. In 1995, the transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE restored the organization to only a marginal role in the security of a Europe where bloody conflicts were underway in the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Since 2000, all Russian Foreign Policy Concepts (FPC) have treated the CSCE and the OSCE as two distinct organizations, not linked by a line of continuity. The choice reflects the ambiguity of Russian politics, swinging between the desire to maintain a role in Europe and the will to preserve at all costs an area of influence in the former Soviet Union closed to external actors. In this second point of view, there is no place for an active role for the OSCE, which since 2014 has been mentioned in Russian official documents and

statements only to accuse NATO countries and the EU of sabotaging multilateral diplomacy (in Western countries, the same *damnatio nominis* is reserved to CSTO and SCO). Therefore, even if a peace or a ceasefire will put an end to war in Ukraine, we cannot expect it will create the conditions for reopening the Helsinki process. Today, the widespread use in Russia of formulas such as "collective West" and "Eurasia" does not reflect the forecast, or the desire of a clash of civilizations, but rather the acceptance of decline of Greater Europe (Russia and former soviet republics included) which is far away from the historical optimism that, despite all flaws, has inspired the Helsinki process.

PAOLO SOAVE

USA AND THE CSCE

For many years, the US foreign policy proved reluctant about the Soviet proposal for a European security conference, as it was well known that the proposal first formulated in 1954 by Vyacheslav Molotov aimed to remove the American influence from Western Europe. In Washington's view, it was just an evolution of Stalin's peace proposal in 1952, which had envisaged German unification in exchange for its neutrality. With this initiative, the Soviet leader aimed to undermine the increasingly stronger bonds of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, hoping for a return to a Europe free of the American presence and exposed to Moscow's influence. After Stalin's death, the idea underwent an evolution linked to the Berlin question: on 26 November 1953, the Soviets proposed a European conference, an idea later developed at the quadripartite summit on 10 February 1954. Rejecting the Western proposal for free elections in Germany, Molotov launched the concept of collective continental security, to be based on certain principles such as the commitment not to use force in the resolution of disputes, consultations in the event of threats to a European country and a general *casus foederis*. Analysing Moscow's aims, Henry Kissinger, who compared the security conference to the League of Nations and the Locarno Pact, pointed out that it would have been a good deal for the Kremlin: it would have become a fully continental player with great influence in the European arrangements, while the Euro-Atlantic bond would have inevitably loosened as it would have been perceived as less important in Western Europe, the Soviet hegemony over the Central and Eastern countries remaining intact. The logical consequence of the advent of the European conference would have been the dissolution of NATO. The goal remained to "break up the Atlantic Alliance". Faced with predictable adverse reactions from the Western countries, Molotov rectified his proposal with a first important opening, the involvement of the United States in a general European security treaty.

It was only in the late 1960s and especially the early 1970s that the Soviet proposal started matching US interests. The key reason that made it more palatable to Western European countries and the USA was the *détente*. As widely acknowledged by historians now, *détente* was the main avenue chosen by the Nixon administration in order to achieve a new dynamism in the relations between the two super powers. On 18 February 1970, in his foreign policy message to Congress, Nixon overturned the USA foreign policy paradigm by stating that “We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around”. Along this realist line, the priorities of the new American policy of *détente* should have been the search for an honourable way out of the Vietnam conflict; the containment of public outcry by proving that the administration was not rigidly bound to the bipolar scheme but also knew how to go further, in particular by widening the international chessboard to include the People’s Republic of China; strengthening alliances; and taking the diplomatic initiative in the Middle East. The attempt to make Moscow more receptive to the *détente* implicitly confirmed the primacy given to constructive dialogue between superpowers by the Nixon administration, to launch a new dynamic phase in international relations based on sharing major international responsibilities with the Soviets.

Détente as a main avenue of the Cold War sounded contradictory to conservatives, who accused the Administration of being weak towards the Kremlin, as well as to liberals for whom it was necessary to increase the pressure on human rights and freedoms violated in the area under Soviet influence. For both political sides Nixon’s policy would ultimately turn to be to the advantage of the USSR. In his memoirs, Kissinger replies to such criticism observing that the White House shared the same judgement - critical and concerned – of the American public opinion on Moscow, considering that the USSR was the only global and antagonising power that could threaten USA national security. However, for the Republican Administration the most immediate concern was much more subtle, being the diplomatic flatteries by the Kremlin towards the Western European countries with an eventual proposal of a re-organization of the European continent. Kissinger remained convinced that prolonging the peaceful competition with Moscow would

have made more remote the risk of a nuclear conflict and in perspective would have led to the only rationally possible solution of the Cold War i.e., the predominance of the liberal-democratic world. The proposal of a security conference could look like a variation of the theme of a *détente* to be conducted mainly between super powers and, therefore, not without the risks of multilateralism. America would have made no concessions to the Kremlin that could not have had the possibility to avoid or condition the direct discussion with the USA, nor unrealistic or unbalanced expectations would have been allowed to the Western European countries. The security conference in Europe would have developed like a reasonable and sustainable compromise between the *détente* in the Cold War - in line with the will of the two super powers – and the *détente beyond* the Cold War, as hoped by the Europeans more far-looking.

The Soviet proposal also had the effect of generating different reactions between the White House and the State Department. Such a divergence was not a surprise nor did it represent a problem for Nixon, who had decided to co-opt the former Harvard professor exactly with the aim of taking full control of the foreign policy and bypassing the establishment. While the State Department regarded the conference as a historic opportunity to introduce more freedom in East Europe and to undermine the USSR, the Nixon Administration was wary of the Soviet proposal and believed that it should have remained at the margins of the *détente*, in order not to make European allies think that the Atlantic commitments – starting with the financial contribution to NATO budget - would be less important.

The CSCE process became a chapter of the so-called Great *Détente*, which eventually culminated on August 1, 1975, through the signature of the Helsinki Final Act. Nixon and Kissinger exploited the Soviet interest in formally recognizing the European status quo, which was the real meaning of their proposal after they had accepted the strategic connection between the USA and Western Europe. Through Kissinger's well-known "principle of linkage", the U.S. foreign policy achieved the Soviet openings on some strategic issues like the MBRF-Multilateral Balanced Reductions Forces, and CBM-Confidence Building Measures which was eventually inserted in the Final Act, even if Moscow had initially proved reluctant to scale back its conventional superiority in

Europe. The CSCE advanced as a consequence of the Great Détente and the superpowers' will to cooperate, as the 1972 bilateral agreements clearly showed, like the SALT, ABM, and the Declaration on principles of peaceful coexistence between superpowers in a spirit of détente, all of them signed by Brezhnev and Nixon.

Despite the United States' will to leave the floor to its Western European allies, the preliminary stage was characterized by increasing coordination among NATO countries, as witnessed by John Maresca, a US diplomat serving at NATO HQs and involved in the process. According to Maresca, when the negotiations entered their decisive phase, the White House's attitude towards the CSCE also changed and Kissinger's entry onto the scene was noticeable, as he was able to monopolise the most important dossiers. It was no coincidence that in 1974, Albert "Bud" Sherer, US Ambassador in Prague, an experienced and skilful negotiator, took over as head of the American delegation, which finally had a diplomat of the highest rank, equal to the qualified Soviet representation, as its leader.

Even if late, Kissinger was the protagonist in dealing with the Soviets. One of the most relevant points of the CSCE was the possibility to peacefully change the borders, according to international law and through negotiations. Moreover, he successfully introduced another cornerstone: the free choice of alliances. As Hans Dietrich Genscher admitted in his memoirs, West Germany could not have signed the Final Act without the decisive U.S. intervention.

It is noteworthy that the U.S. engagement in the CSCE process, even if late and behind the scenes, was enough to raise harsh criticism against the Nixon and Ford administrations. Democrats and most conservative Republicans opposed the White House's decision to invest in the CSCE because it sounded like a weakness toward Moscow. Criticism against CSCE and détente was personally led in the USA by Solzhenitsyn after he was expelled from the USSR. As proof of general embarrassment, the Soviet dissident wasn't received at the White House before the Helsinki Final Act. The liberal press invited President Ford to ignore the event ("Jerry, don't go"). However, U.S. diplomacy had already invested in the process.

Kissinger wanted the President to reaffirm U.S. interest for Europe in Helsinki, whose security was going to remain linked to the Atlantic

dimension. What was envisaged in the Final Act had a clear political and moral significance, a multilateral commitment to reduce tensions and to increase cooperation between East and West. It would have been important also to recall that the CSCE represented an important but not exclusive framework for the détente, which would continue to have in disarmament its major chapter.

In Helsinki, Ford reached what is supposed to be the highest point of his presidency, at least in foreign policy. Looking at Brezhnev, the President said that the USA would take the new commitments seriously, and that the Soviets were expected to do the same.

Kissinger reported in his memoirs that all the criticism against the White House for supporting Helsinki was short-sighted. What was felt everywhere as a Soviet victory and the recognition of the status quo of spheres of influence on Europe was the end of the Brezhnev doctrine. Maybe the Soviets weren't aware of the significant change they had accepted while celebrating such a long-awaited success.

As history would show fourteen years later, Helsinki was a Western victory and the USA had contributed to it.

GIUSEPPE SPAGNULO

ITALY AND THE 'CSCE FOLLOW-UP'
FROM BELGRADE TO VIENNA (1977-1989)

The reactions in Italy following the signature of the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975 varied in tones within the political, cultural, media and diplomatic elites. In general terms, these reactions expressed a mix of satisfaction, caution and wariness, and in some cases scepticism and perplexity. The signature of that document had not spurred in reality significant opinions at public level. Events which unfolded in Helsinki remained substantially confined in small and restricted discussions, while media and public opinion in general were focusing mainly on domestic political developments.

The results of the CSCE negotiating process and its advantages were primarily the focus of the analysis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by those diplomats who had participated in the complex negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki and had supported the political leadership, Minister Aldo Moro first, followed by Minister Mariano Rumor, throughout the whole process. An internal note of the Directorate General for Political Affairs, after the summit, stressed that results achieved in Helsinki were "in line with our thinking and needs". In fact, Western countries had succeeded in defusing the main dangers steaming from the Soviet Union's approach and ultimate goals.

The essential, if not exclusive, goal pursued by the Soviets in the CSCE was the formulation of a "declaration" with the aim, on the one hand, to have the territorial annexations recognised and the borders resulting from the Second World War definitively fixed; on the other, to recognise the political status quo in Europe and, in particular, the existence of special relations within the socialist community, as well as the legitimacy of certain forms of intervention, such as those intrinsic to the "Brezhnev Doctrine"; finally, to base on the recognition of the existence of a European regional law, partially different from the general law, the

foundations of a security system in which the USSR could acquire a pre-dominant weight in Europe.

According to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was possible to complement the Declaration of Principles contained in the Final Act with a number of commitments more specific and concrete, within the so called “baskets”. Furthermore, the Declaration of Principles did not absolutely constitute – as alleged by some critics – a recognition or a crystallization of the territorial situation existing at that time in Europe. In addition, several aspects of the Declaration, as well as other parts of the Final Act provided – especially to Eastern European States – the basis for more autonomy, in order to legitimately oppose the “Brezhnev Doctrine” and to block somehow Moscow from applying it in the future, especially along the tragic modalities already experimented in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. For these reasons, the greatest success of Helsinki was “a definition of the principle of human rights and of fundamental freedoms that goes beyond expectations”.

If the overall achievements of the CSCE were considered positive, the Ministry’s note underlined that it was still a starting point of a process to be defined, whose major results would need the good will of all participating States in the implementation phase. Given the fact that the Helsinki principles were closer to the values and to the thinking of the Western bloc, much would have depended on the implementation by the USSR and the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

Regulated at the Helsinki Conference by the “Basket Four” of the Final Act, the Follow-up Meetings were designed by the 35 participating States in order to avoid a full institutionalisation of the CSCE. This was largely due to the wishes of Western States, which were concerned about the potential spread of Soviet influence within this organisation and the possible weakening of other Western international bodies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Economic Community (EEC). Consequently, the CSCE Follow-ups were designed to be flexible, and thus it was expected that each new meeting would be negotiated and scheduled on a case-by-case basis.

Such a situation could potentially have given rise to certain risks to the continuity of the so-called “Helsinki process”, in particular if relations between the Cold War blocs had deteriorated, as they did in the late 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s. In the 22 months between

the signature of the Helsinki Final Act and the inaugural session in Belgrade of the new CSCE preparatory meeting (June 1977), several developments were emerging in the West-East dynamics and diplomats from all participating States had to take this into account.

From this perspective, it can be argued that Italy's stance towards the "Helsinki Follow-ups" was characterised by an unwavering commitment to safeguarding the multilateral context, even in an environment characterised by significant challenges. As a great support of the CSCE process, Italy worked hard for implementing the "Helsinki spirit" through concrete steps. One of the main initiatives undertaken by Italy's government consisted in finding a final solution to the definition of its Eastern border with Yugoslavia with the signature of the Treaty of Osimo in November 1975. Few months earlier, the Italian Parliament had ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Later on, Italy carried out parliamentary ratifications of international treaties on civic and political rights, on economic, social and cultural rights, including the annexed protocol which granted to individual citizens the possibility to apply to international bodies in case of violations of their rights. Furthermore, Italy actively engaged in the coordination among NATO allies and EEC partners in order to prepare the common positions in view of the meeting in Belgrade, especially in the framework of the CSCE Working Group established within the EEC.

During the preparation to the Follow-Up meeting in Belgrade, this Working Group – and in general Western diplomats – had to face a number of initiatives by the USSR that Moscow presented as part of the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, such as the proposal for pan-European conferences on transport, energy and environment under the umbrella of UNECE, and the proposal of an agreement between COMECON and EEC. In general, Western countries opted for a wait-and-see approach in response to these initiatives, considering them in line with specific interests of the Soviet Union rather than with the "Helsinki spirit". The bottom line was that in Belgrade there should not have been any reserve, modification or limitation to the Final Act, which had to be reaffirmed in full. Despite some openings and initiatives by the Soviets, in no way the West could consider satisfactory Moscow's implementation of the "third basket". Therefore, in Belgrade it was necessary to

reaffirm the need to implement in the most ample and balanced way all commitments and principles agreed on in Helsinki.

The accession of Jimmy Carter to the White House, with his strong push for human rights, had a significant impact on the line followed by the EEC. Differently from the previous US Administration, Carter wanted to raise the profile of the CSCE and step up the criticism towards the USSR and the Communist regimes precisely in the field of human rights and the “third basket”. Such a posture created new frictions among the two blocs and caught unprepared EEC Member States, in particular Italy, that wanted to avoid an involution or a collapse of the Helsinki process.

Italy fully shared this point of view. From the Italian perspective there were several reasons for not letting the Helsinki process derail: the need to safeguard its own *Ostpolitik* and good relations with the USSR and the countries of the Warsaw Pact; the need to preserve the relations with the Italian Communist Party that was essential in that moment to keep the government alive, and the complex economic situation in the country. Among the Western countries, Italy was fully aware that for the USSR it was impossible to proceed to a radical process of implementation of the “third basket” and many other commitments of the Final Act. Without prejudice to the need to preserve the Helsinki Final Act in its entirety, Italy along with the other EEC countries searched for a gradual, patient, constructive and non-hostile approach.

This was particularly evident at the Belgrade Meeting in 1977, where Italian diplomacy did not adopt the most extreme position on human rights, advocated by the US delegation. Instead, it sought to ensure that the robust debate on this issue did not result in a definitive rupture in this pan-European diplomatic framework, as stated by the Undersecretary of State Luciano Radi at the opening of the Belgrade Meeting on October 1977.

The Meeting in Belgrade ended on March 9, 1978 with a final document that was very concise and slim in terms of content. The media commented it as a failure, in some cases of the whole Helsinki process. According to an internal note of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Belgrade document represented at the same time the result of the difficulties registered during the discussion and the confirmation of the

determination of the participating States to guarantee the continuity of the process started with the signature of the Final Act.

Even more challenging was the Madrid meeting, where negotiations lasted for three years, from 1980 to 1983, with many interruptions, which required considerable resilience. During this period, the international scenario was characterised by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Euro-missile crisis and, most significantly, the Polish crisis and the subsequent declaration of martial law, which had a profound impact in Madrid.

In the Madrid meeting Italy endeavoured to prevent a break-up, although it was not spared from severe criticism of the Soviet Union and the Polish military government. During those years of heightened international tension, there were moments when the CSCE constituted the sole remaining forum for dialogue between East and West. At the opening session on 11 November 1980, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emilio Colombo, recalled the violations of the human rights and condemned the invasion of Afghanistan but he stressed the need to safeguard the West-East détente, making public the Italian intention of proposing the organization of "a meeting that could define an appropriate framework for negotiating confidence building measures in the military area, that can be verified and implemented to the whole European continent". It is interesting to note that Italy decided to participate in the meeting in Madrid at the highest political level despite the fact that no agreement – not even among the EEC – was reached on the level of participation. Furthermore, Colombo had inaugurated just in September an Italian "Helsinki Commission", along the same model of the Helsinki Commission in the USA. As Ambassador Paolo Pucci di Benisichi wrote:

The very fact that a consensus was reached in the Spanish capital on the adoption of a substantial Concluding Document in the Thirty-five confirmed, on the other hand, that the CSCE process, although obviously exposed to the influences coming from the global context of East-West relations, remained potentially capable, by virtue of its multilateral character, of deploying stabilising and even re-

compositional effects on the fabric of relations between the two blocs, and inter-European relations in a broader sense¹.

Italy, in collaboration with the other EEC partners, invested significant efforts to safeguard this crucial channel of communication. A strong supporter of the pan-European dialogue, which undoubtedly also benefited its own economic and trade interests in Eastern Europe, Italy had as main objective to keep the dialogue going.

In addition, in the CSCE follow-ups, Italy supported a balanced deepening of all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act, from the military to the economic and humanitarian. Rome made a very important contribution to the conception of many of the instruments adopted in those years, such as the so-called "Confidence and Security Building Measures" contained in the Final Document of the Stockholm Conference in 1986, and it was also very active in drawing the CSCE's attention to the problems of the Mediterranean.

Furthermore, Italy also attached great importance to the human rights and individual freedoms, although it was aware that such changes could only take place gradually in the Communist bloc. When the international situation became more favourable, especially with the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the Kremlin, Italy had no qualms about demanding greater guarantees of freedom and rights in the Eastern European countries, as it did at the Vienna meeting between 1986 and 1989. Vienna's concluding document produced relevant and positive results in terms of advancement in every aspect of the CSCE matters, military, economic, humanitarian, with broader hopes for the future developments of this international forum.

With Vienna, the CSCE seemed to have fulfilled at best the objectives it had set itself in 1975 in Helsinki, and Italy had also been able to play its cards at its best within that framework. However, the international landscape was on the brink of a significant transformation at the end of the Vienna meeting.

In conclusion, the Italian political leadership in the 1970s and 1980s tended to regard the CSCE as one pillar of its foreign policy, together

¹ P. PUCCI DI BENISICHI, *Gli sviluppi del processo CSCE: lineamenti generali*, in V. TORNETTA (a cura di), *Verso l'Europa del 2000*, cit., p. 164.

with the Atlantic and EEC pillars. The CSCE pillar was relevant in order to contribute to the "détente" in a divided Europe and to bring East and West closer together, in line with Willy Brandt's doctrine of "change through rapprochement". From the Italian point of view, the importance of the CSCE would remain even after the end of the Cold War, if only because the CSCE, and later the OSCE, was the only European organisation to include Russia. And Italy has long regarded the maintenance of a pan-European dialogue with Russia as an important factor for peace and stability on this continent.

MATTEO GERLINI

THE END OF THE COLD WAR
AND THE CREATION OF THE ORGANISATION
FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The end of the Cold War could be considered as coinciding with the end of the bipolar system, i.e., with the end of an international system based on States that - to different degrees - were linked to the Soviet Union or the United States of America, or followed tangent lines in the search for autonomy, without succeeding in their turn in aggregating a third bloc. If one chooses this coincidence, one invariably loses the significance of the events from 1987 on, when the great tension between the two blocs finally eased, to 1992, when the Soviet bloc no longer existed and the US unipolar temptation began. In essence, the substantial difference between the Cold War and the bipolar system fades away; a space that was not at all conceptual but rather real and pragmatic, and in which the transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE took place. Amid hopes and surprises, the transition from Conference to Organisation developed intertwiningly with the end of the Cold War and it was marked, more or less unexpectedly, by the end of bipolarity.

The Helsinki Final Act had marked the climax of the Great Détente, but subsequent events seemed to fall short of the expectations that the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe had nurtured. The détente crisis, with the resurgence of tensions and conflicts encapsulated in the Second Cold War, seemed to have left the CSCE in a past, near but definitely gone¹.

In reality, the main crises of the Second Cold War did not directly affect the structure of the Helsinki Accords. The Euro-Missile crisis with its peak in 1979 developed around the divergent interpretation of the SALT I agreements: the Soviet government regarded the SS-20

¹ L. NUTI, *The Crisis of Détente in Europe. From Helsinki to Gorbachev*, London e New York, 2009.

missiles as a modernisation permitted by the agreements, the US government regarded them as an increase in nuclear warheads, followed in this assumption by many Western European governments². The start of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took place on 27 December, a few days after the NATO meeting (12 December) that adopted the double-track decision, formalising the Euro-missile crisis within tracks from which the course of events ultimately did not derail. Pershing II missiles would be deployed within NATO, along with BMG 109G Gryphon missiles, with the readiness to stop if the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its new launchers³. The escalating tension marked by the war in Afghanistan equally did not call into question the letter of the agreements and commitments made by the Soviet government with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. In fact, the document stated that states would respect the sovereign equality and individuality of each member, as well as all rights inherent in and encompassed by their sovereignty, including in particular the right of each state to legal equality, territorial integrity, and political freedom and independence⁴. The Soviet Union had committed itself, albeit non-bindingly, not to interfere in the CSCE area, so military intervention in Afghanistan did not violate the agreements.

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty of 8 December 1987 closed not only the Euro-Missile Crisis, but the last Cold War chapter, leaving the proxy wars in Africa to die out by force of inertia⁵. The Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, increased the resources devoted to the reform programme - perestroika, literally “restructuring”, which aimed to introduce civil and political freedoms in the Soviet Union.

The Gorbachev reform programme implied the end of Soviet control over the people's democracies in the Warsaw Pact countries: for

² B. ROTHER, F. BOZO, L. NUTI, M.-P. REY, *The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Washington, 2015.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ V.-Y. GHEBALI, *The Diplomacy of Détente: The CSCE from Helsinki to Vienna 1973-1989*, Vol. I, Bruxelles, 1989.

⁵ M. GUDERZO, B. BAGNATO, *The Globalization of Cold War. Diplomacy and local confrontation*, Washington, 2010.

them began the great change of 1989, with the first free movement across what had been the iron curtain.

Hungary opened its borders with Austria on 27 June 1989, thus allowing East German citizens, who could easily move within the Warsaw Pact countries, to also cross easily into West Germany. On 9 November of the same year, the Berlin Wall was finally torn down.

It was quite understandable that the CSCE was the first international arena in which the ongoing transition could find a constructive, and if possible evolutionary, dimension. As early as 1989, the participating States agreed on the relevance of the CSCE, whose spirit - faded but not extinguished during the second Cold War - had partly triggered the process of transformation in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the “change” pushed that common spirit which had animated the Helsinki Agreements towards the creation of an organisation that would translate the same principles into action, broadening and deepening them. This was a natural evolution, but neither necessary nor inevitable. The process became concrete in 1989 and reached completion in 1996, through a process of institutionalising the aims and objectives of the CSCE into what was to become the OSCE.

Speaking at the Council of Europe on 6 July 1989, Gorbachev proposed the creation of a common European home. In his project, Gorbachev referred back to the Helsinki Final Act. Therefore, as Armellini recalls, the discussion revolved around a “Helsinki II”, which would end the period of the division of Europe⁶.

On a strategic level, the dynamic started with the INF Treaty accelerated in 1989, with the start of negotiations for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, aimed at significantly reducing land and air armaments in Europe. The negotiation tackled the problem of the armaments needed to conduct surprise attacks and large-scale invasions, covering the area known as the ATTU (Atlantic to the Urals). It was a crucial step for the East-West convergence because it dismantled much of the military investment that had been at the basis of the formation of the blocs, and thus the division of Europe. The negotiation and its

⁶ A. ARMELLINI, *L'Italia e la Carta di Parigi della CSCE per una nuova Europa. Storia di un negoziato (luglio-novembre 1990)*, Napoli, 2022.

Treaty nourished the evolution of the CSCE into the OSCE, as it changed security doctrines in Europe.

The Ottawa Open Skies Treaty of 12-13 February 1990 continued and completed this path of decreasing militarisation of Europe. According to Armellini, Ottawa was a difficult moment for Italian diplomacy and for the Minister of foreign affairs, Gianni De Michelis, who was trying to seize the open spaces to leave the constraints of post-war and bipolarity behind him once and for all⁷.

The chronology of the organisation of the CSCE's conferences on the human dimension is interesting: the first in Paris from 30 May to 23 June 1989, on the eve of the opening of the Hungarian border, was followed the year after by a new meeting in Copenhagen, from 5 to 29 June, in the course of the free elections in the former Soviet Republics; finally, a third in Moscow, from 10 September to 4 October 1991, in the aftermath of the putsch. The theme of the human dimension was contained in the "third basket" of the Helsinki Accords, which Ennio Di Nolfo considers the one that cracked the Soviet construct⁸. The intention was to build a 'common and global' security organisation centred on this basket. The final document of the Copenhagen conference set out the elements of the human dimension in a reunited Europe, where pluralistic democracy and rule of law would be essential to guarantee respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms⁹.

Other initiatives within the CSCE context were running in parallel to the conferences on the human dimension. Some of them were far more important than those conferences, with an obvious osmosis, nurturing a process not lacking in the empiricism needed to deal with the great complexity of founding an international organisation. On the occasion of Gorbachev's State visit to Italy on 29 November 1990, Minister De Michelis had the opportunity to express Italy's appreciation for the reform plan of the Soviet leader, reiterating that he shared the spirit of Helsinki. Only a "Helsinki II" would have resolved the problems of East and West, which De Michelis saw beyond the rhetoric – although

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ E. DI NOLFO, *Dagli imperi militari agli imperi tecnologici*, Roma-Bari, 2014 (2002).

⁹ V.Y. GHEBALI, *The OSCE in Post-Communist Europe: Towards a Pan-European Security Identity 1990-1996*, Vol. II, Bruxelles, 1996.

based on the reality – of the triumph of the West and the end of the blocs. A thirty-five-member Summit was proposed, and a Preparatory Committee was convened in November 1990 in Paris. The Preparatory Committee worked expeditiously and prepared the text of the Paris Charter for a New Europe. In the Paris negotiations there was an identity of position between the United States and the Soviet Union, and both the European Community commitment on the part of the governments of the EC Member States and the Atlantic commitment on the part of the United States were renewed.

For the Americans, the institutionalisation of the CSCE seemed to question the survival of NATO. Would it become a second player compared to the OSCE? It was a debate that animated only the Americans and the Western Europeans, because the Russians were preoccupied with quite different problems and were moreover indirectly involved in the debate. In fact, it was in those months that De Michelis argued for the need for the Soviet Union to join the Atlantic Alliance¹⁰.

Within this framework, De Michelis also presented the “Pentagonal” proposal, an evolution of his earlier “Quadrangular” initiative. Since 1988 he had promoted a dialogue with the governments of Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia aimed at building a structure of economic and political cooperation, subsidiary to the alliances and the EC. When Italy held the presidency of the European Community in 1990, he relaunched the proposal by extending it to Czechoslovakia, and later, in 1991, to Poland, thus becoming a ‘Hexagonal’¹¹. It is relevant to remember how much De Michelis and Italian policy sought to translate the spirit of Helsinki into regional actions, informed by that practice that was at the basis of the construction of the OSCE, i.e., compatibility with alliances, or rather with the Atlantic Alliance, given that the Warsaw Pact in 1991 was to end following the coup in the Soviet Union.

The Paris Charter for a New Europe of 21 November 1990 accelerated the process of transforming the CSCE into the OSCE, which was to be completed in 1995. But by the time the CSCE became an

¹⁰ G. DE MICHELIS, *La lunga ombra di Yalta. La specificità della politica italiana*, Venezia, 2003.

¹¹ IDEM, *La lezione della storia. Sul futuro dell'Italia e le prospettive dell'Europa*, 2013.

organisation, its Eastern European promoters had already left the scene. Although at the time of the adoption of the Paris Charter, only Lithuania had declared independence from the USSR, the coup in Russia in August 1991 had eliminated the Paris Charter's firmest political supporter, namely Gorbachev. Within a few months, the leading institutional actor in guaranteeing the charter, the USSR, had disappeared. Before the coup, in April 1991, Georgia had formally left the Soviet Union. After the coup, all the Republics of the USSR had declared their independence. Governed by Boris Yeltsin, the new Russian Federation promoted the Commonwealth of Independent States, a mild institutional formula compared to the previous Soviet Union, which Georgia refused to join.

On 7 February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed; Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the European Union in the same year that the OSCE was created, 1995. NATO, whose function seemed to be called into question by the end of the Warsaw Pact, found new impetus in those years. In 1994, the Partnership for Peace was launched, a partnership initiative with other countries that was prodromal to the enlargement of the Alliance. The Central European countries joined the alliance in 1997 with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, but already two years earlier, in 1995, NATO had been skilfully reinserted by President Bill Clinton into the strategic and political landscape of the new international system with the 1993 Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia. This framework seriously and irreversibly downsized the aspirations that some had attributed to the expected OSCE, which could have played the same role in the war that ravaged the former Yugoslav Republic. However, the renewal of NATO and the creation of the EU gave the organisation in essence a far-reaching regional role, compatible and in many respects integrated with the EU and also with NATO.

According to Galbreath, after that set of events branded in a simplified manner as “the collapse of the Berlin Wall”, the CSCE had in fact focused on maintaining a democratic character in the post-Soviet transition and – a logically connected but not necessary element – free market reforms¹², i.e., a direction of economic freedom after State-directed

¹² D.J. GALBREATH, *The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*, London e New York, 2007.

economy, but whose declination was so vast that it was ultimately difficult to manage. Interwoven with this powerful shift towards the market was another one, perhaps even more powerful: nationalism, which had never really dissolved in the Soviet system, re-emerged forcefully. Although the democratisation programme of the CSCE deployed the weight of the international forum towards the institutions and actors of reference in the democratic transition, the nations - or ethnicities, depending on the perspective of observation - demolished the Yugoslav Federation; they contributed to dissolving the Soviet Union, which collapsed under the pressure of different and purely internal political forces; they divided Czechoslovakia, posing an objective problem to an institution that guaranteed in its fundamentals the maintenance of its borders. On a contiguous but different level was the reunification of Germany, which dissolved the German Democratic Republic.

The need to respond to the centrifugal force of nationalism and the collapse of states in Central and Eastern Europe was one of the elements that most shaped the development of the conference into an organisation. It is no coincidence that one of the peculiarities of nationalism in Eastern Europe, the defence of the environment – eco-nationalism, as defined in historiography¹³ – found one of its first areas of development within the conference. The Environmental Protection meeting in Sofia in 1989 laid the grounds for the economic-environmental dimension that the Organization would acquire. Because environmentalism did not have an overtly subversive political project, Eastern Bloc institutions proved to be quite disarmed in dealing with protests across the society that ultimately challenged the Soviet model itself and Russian supremacy. Moreover, environmentalism addressed issues that tended toward a transnational dimension, as they followed physical geography rather than political geography. The Sofia meeting discussed countering three types of environmental crises: industrial accidents, chemical mismanagement, and threats to water sources. The meeting report called for greater coordination among participating states to prevent transboundary contamination. Although the meeting showed the importance of the environment in the CSCE agenda in the early post-Cold War period,

¹³ IDEM, *La lezione della storia. Sul futuro dell'Italia e le prospettive dell'Europa*, 2013.

this relevance was not preserved, according to Galbreath¹⁴. In the process of transforming the CSCE into the OSCE, a number of institutions dedicated to specific aspects inherent or cross-cutting to security and cooperation in strengthening democracy were created, but there was not one dedicated to the environment, despite what the “second basket” of the Final Act envisages. This has not prevented several participating States to continue paying attention to the topic in the OSCE agenda for the economic dimension.

The CSCE seemed to be the best political environment to deal with the problems arising from the ongoing transition in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. There had been not only the collapse of States, including in it the end of the German Democratic Republic, but there was also the stalling of transitions, and the opening of transnational crises whose roots often predated the Soviet system itself. Once the OSCE became an organization, it focused on crisis areas, including the vast Caspian and Central Asian region, a far cry from the European epicentre that had seen the rise of the CSCE. The Asian trajectory in the dissolution of the Soviet Union had created new States, new governments, new hopes and new problems. Certainly, even in Europe, aside from the Balkan crisis, not all democratic transitions followed the same path, as the Belarusian case still testifies.

The Conference created institutions with which to address the new challenges of the post-Cold War era from time to time, expanding a constellation of international subjects that in practice realized the transition from “Conference on” to “Organization for.” The process of establishing the bodies that eventually constituted the OSCE began with the aforementioned adoption of the Paris Charter for a New Europe. The Charter created a permanent Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna and the Office for Free Elections (the precursor to the ODIHR) in Warsaw. Although the Charter was adopted in Paris, the choice of locations for the institutions and the proposed organization was all oriented toward Central and Eastern Europe. The CSCE was embarking on a transformative process looking primarily East of Vienna. And although the Secretariat was in the Austrian Capital, in

¹⁴ D.J. GALBREATH, *The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*, London e New York, 2007.

general the other institutions were established in various locations, such as Warsaw, but also Copenhagen, where the Parliamentary Assembly was established in 1992, and The Hague, where the Office of the High Commissioner for Minorities is based. The decision to have a decentralized physiognomy was a strategy - according to some scholars - to avoid the hypertrophic development of a centralized bureaucracy. Thus, the Helsinki Document of 1992, implementing the guidelines established in Paris, had created the High Commissioner for National Minorities.

Reflecting the change in terminology from “Conference” to “Organization,” the position was created as High Commissioner “on” Minorities rather than “for” Minorities. Conflicts in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia between majorities and ethnic minorities, as well as perceived discrimination against Russians in the Baltic States, against Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania, and against Turks in Bulgaria – not an exhaustive list – stressed the need to address potential ethnic conflicts before they occurred. The focus on “national” minorities is noteworthy, as it excludes immigrants or refugees, concentrating the High Commissioner's work on former Eastern Bloc States, where the minority problem was more pressing than that of refugees or migration. With the Helsinki Document of 1992, the CSCE had created the only institution among international organizations dealing specifically with national minorities¹⁵.

Finally, after the Helsinki Summit in 1992, the third Summit in the process that began with the Paris Charter took place in Budapest, a Central European city that had experienced the intervention of Soviet armed forces to suppress the 1956 revolution. On December 6, 1994, the CSCE Summit in the Hungarian Capital decided to change the name from “Conference” to “Organization.” There was a common desire to give the CSCE a new political impetus, thus enabling it to play a crucial role in meeting the challenges of the 21st century. To reflect this determination, the CSCE would henceforth be known as the OSCE. By the time of the name change, most of the organization's bodies had

¹⁵ A. MIHR, *Transformation and Development. Studies in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Member States*, e-book, 2020.

already been created. Only the OSCE Representative on Media Freedom would be established later, in 1997¹⁶.

Whereas for the European dimension, i.e., “Helsinki II”, security and cooperation found its main axes of development in the European integration process and in the revitalization of the Atlantic structure, in South Caucasus and Central Asia a very different situation was created. In those areas the OSCE became the international framework within which to find resources for the consolidation of post-Soviet state transformation. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan joined the United Nations in 1992, and in conjunction, joined the OSCE as a regional organization capable of containing centrifugal drives.

The OSCE intervened following the civil war in Tajikistan with its first long-term mission since its creation, in Dushanbe in 1994, securing the peace agreements that ended the war in 1997. The following year, the OSCE opened centres in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, becoming a promoter of security with respect to terrorism and organized crime as well¹⁷.

The Euro-American intervention in Afghanistan following the attacks of Sept. 11th 2001 catalysed the concerns of OSCE participating States over Western interference in Central Asia, motivated by strengthening democracy and human rights. The conversion of the Shanghai Group - the forum that shared border management between Russia, China and neighbouring Central Asian countries - into the Shanghai Cooperation Initiative (SCO), also created in 2001 with the accession of Uzbekistan, must be understood within this historical framework. The process triggered by the invasion of Afghanistan also led, in its fundamentally destructive dynamics of international arrangements, to the subsequent transformation of the 1996 Tashkent Pact into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) created in 2002, which included the South and Central Asian Caucasian countries in a new defence and security structure. In the years that followed, however, the same countries reconnected with the OSCE over fears

¹⁶ V.Y. GHEBALI, *The Role of OSCE in Eurasia: from the Lisbon Summit to the Maastricht Ministerial Council 1996-2003*, Vol. III, Bruxelles, 2014.

¹⁷ A. MIHR, *Between Peace and Conflict in the East and the West. Studies on transformation and development in the OSCE region*, Cham, 2021.

of a pan-Russian policy toward them. Turkmenistan never joined Moscow nor Beijing's defence organizations, while Uzbekistan suspended CSTO membership in 2012.

The “Wilsonianism in the boots” practiced by the George W. Bush Administrations weakened the OSCE, to the advantage of those structures that limited the European participation to the Russian Federation and excluded, naturally, the American one. However, on the other hand, it must be taken into account that since the beginning of the neo-isolationist retreat of the United States, to which the great financial crisis of 2008 contributed, the attractiveness of Russian and Chinese defence initiatives has cooled considerably. Conversely, the OSCE's credit in Asia has not dissolved, as shown, for example, by recent plans to exploit water resources, which are crucial in trying to avert conflicts over the use of water.

PART 2

THE ROAD TO HELSINKI AND BEYOND: OFFICIAL STATEMENTS BY ITALY



Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, US President Gerald Ford
and Italian Foreign Minister Mariano Rumor
Helsinki, 1 August 1975,
ANSA ARCHIVE

1 DECEMBER 1972

SPEECH BY H.E. THE AMBASSADOR MARCO FAVALE
AT THE HELSINKI PRELIMINARIES

Mr. President, Ambassadors, I am pleased to join the many other colleagues who have expressed their felicitations that you, Mr. President, have been chosen by our esteem and confidence to preside over our work. It was a natural and expected choice, but it is for all of us reason for satisfaction that the unanimity of consensus has gathered around your person.

With an awareness of the importance of the tasks entrusted to us by our governments, we accepted the suggestion addressed to us by the hospitable Finnish Government for a meeting between the Heads of Mission of European countries and of two countries that are linked to Europe by so many essential ties. We also welcome among us representatives of some friendly states that until now had no permanent missions in Helsinki. Thus begins to take shape the idea of a meeting of all states, which are geographically and politically part of Europe, an idea that had been a topic of general debate for years.

These efforts start from the already existing realities; but they also aim to create new ones that, with the help of the United States and Canada, consolidate détente in Europe and increase, in all areas, the content and also the prospects of inter-European cooperation: from the economic, commercial and techno-scientific fields to that, so important, of human exchanges, of people, and of ideas and human relations. This more intense and solid structure of cooperation cannot, in our opinion, be separated from a deepening and strengthening of the basic principles of European coexistence.

Europe has lived for a quarter of a century without armed conflicts, and this has been an achievement whose importance cannot be sufficiently appreciated. Those who speak to you are convinced that this peace owes much to the free alliance of a number of states on both sides of the Atlantic and to the free association of some Western European

states. The former is animated by a defensive spirit; the latter, the European Economic Community now in full development and determined to perfect its solidarity, remains, at the same time, open to all cooperation and aims to help overcome the contrasts on the European continent, giving new dimensions to economic, cultural, human and political relations between all the countries of Europe.

While international peace has reigned in Europe, there has nevertheless been no lack of serious reasons for disquiet, tension, profound ideal divergences, and differing assessments of events that have made the path from détente to mutual understanding more arduous in the post-war period. We must be able to give the present peace a foundation that rests on a more secure basis, and above all on the establishment of a climate of mutual trust; precisely that trust between Governments, peoples and men which is timidly beginning to form and without which it is vain to hope for profound progress.

If this is, as Italy believes, the ultimate goal which the eventual Conference must set itself, I am convinced that all of us around this table will aim to work so that, within a short time, it may be convened. Our work will not be easy, but I am certain that it will always be inspired by the sincere will to achieve this end. Our work must be patient, serious, thorough but at the same time flexible and pragmatic. The assessment of our orientations and ideas will have to be carried out in an agile and concrete manner, as the very name Helsinki Preliminaries indicates. We are grateful to the Finnish authorities for offering the European governments a way to meet in this city. Finland's balance and wisdom are the pledge that our work can take place outside of dogma, and through an attentive and tenacious search for common ground.

That is why we attach great importance to these multilateral conversations. The very future of the CSCE depends on them. We all, and certainly Italy, firmly desire that the conference be convened and that our foreign ministers can discuss the issues of security and cooperation and come to decisions that will mark a new stage in the life of Europeans. But in order for this to happen, we must create the basis for these meetings and decisions. Precisely in order for the discussions between ministers to be successful, we will not be able to limit ourselves to defining the technical procedures of convening the CSCE. Political events do not happen by chance or automatically; events must be prepared by

men by preparing the most suitable general conditions. To ensure that our Ministries will have all the elements to identify where a decision is possible, we will have to deliberate among ourselves what the draft mandates might be for the Commissions, in order to get to the bottom of the issues during the CSCE by possibly then entrusting ad hoc Groups with the drafting of certain mandate texts.

We all wish for the future conference to be a complete success and for the groundwork for this success to be laid as of now. This means that our work should not hesitate to address those aspects of substance that will enable us to identify with the greatest exactitude the issues to be discussed and the objectives to be pursued. Numerous exploratory contacts over the past two years on the part of all European countries have made it possible to delimit the area of our work. To assert that by now it has already been decided that the Conference will certainly be convened or to let it be understood, on the contrary, that no decision has yet been made, are both politically fragile statements. We must start with the sincere conviction that the CSCE will take place because this is the expectation of our peoples, who wish for higher economic and civil welfare and freer and more trusting coexistence. At the same time, however, we must act realistically so that this can actually happen.

The essential part of this task is to set the agenda for the conference. On this, as we already know, there are some differences of opinion among us. We start, however, from an important point of consensus: namely, that we want to give a firmer foundation to the security of states and to free relations among men in Europe, and that we want, through the establishment of a new climate in Europe, to develop cooperation and to open up new avenues for understanding among peoples. We must therefore try to determine in what concrete way these aims are to be achieved, and let us not be satisfied with vague definitions that could only facilitate the emergence of misunderstandings. While it is true that the final decision on the agenda will be up to the ministers in their first meetings in the Conference itself, it is equally true that this will be all the easier as we have cleared the ground of the greatest number of obstacles. It would be a vain effort if we forgot that the most solid foundation of peace and security among states is represented by this human dimension, which must be a dimension of freedom.

Two other important issues that face us are, on the one hand, the definition of the type of Conference best suited to ensure its success; on the other hand, the rules of procedure to be used by this Conference. At some point we will have to entrust a group of our associates with the precise definition of these procedures, looking at them from a broad political angle. Without affecting the sovereignty of our states and thus condoning the principle of democratic equality among our states, the progress of our discussion may bring the need to employ voting systems in certain matters of procedure and organization. Our first session should enable us to compare, in an open dialectic, our basic approaches. A period of reflection will immediately follow for us and especially for our Governments, so that from careful evaluations of our first views and exchanges, suggestions for the useful continuation of our work may emerge. We must proceed with intensity but without harmful haste. On the other hand, it is clear that our expertise finds a natural limit in the guidelines that only our Governments can adopt and possibly modify.

It follows that, precisely in order to facilitate the work and to accelerate its progress, appropriately interspersed sessions are to be envisaged: the actual intensity of the work will not suffer and ultimately, the outcome will be more successful. I hope that our discussions will always be frank but at the same time permeated by the conviction of our common good faith and our best will to promote security and cooperation in Europe. Finally, allow me to express the hope that peace and security being indivisible, the results we will achieve in Europe may make an effective contribution to peace and cooperation also in other regions close to it, which are, moreover, particularly interesting for European security and especially dear to the soul of us Italians, such as the Mediterranean region where problems of common interest could be examined, as soon as the general situation allows, by a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean of which the CSCE could constitute a useful precedent. May our dialogue therefore be a stimulus and an example, and may the peace and security that we shall consolidate become the peace and security not only of the peoples of Europe, but also of those who have so much in common with Europe in terms of history, traditions and interests.

5 JULY 1973

SPEECH BY THE HON. MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GIUSEPPE MEDICI AT THE CSCE MINISTERIAL SESSION
IN HELSINKI¹

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this Conference of ours offers us the fundamental opportunity to carry forward, in joint, solemn form and in a broader framework, the ongoing dialogue. Italy has made its contribution to the détente process, in the conviction that Europe must first and foremost set itself objectives of peace. Therefore, the proposed convening of a European Conference has always met with our favour. Only a general conference on European problems -- to be prepared with commitment so as to ensure its success -- could provide the appropriate venue for the search for the necessary rapprochement between our peoples.

From a static policy of opposing blocs, we could move to a policy of movement, and thus overcome the moment of radical distrust, to begin a policy of cooperation in security. Having this goal firmly in mind, we have advocated the need to conduct the negotiations in successive stages; and this both to ensure the continuity of the détente process and to be able to take into account the probable occurrence of new political events. The Moscow and Warsaw Treaties, the agreements on Berlin, and those between the FRG and the GDR, have made a decisive contribution to the improvement of the European atmosphere, facilitating the preparation of this fundamental meeting of ours.

The Conference has certain characteristics of its own that I wish to emphasize:

1. It is attended by all European states – besides the United States and Canada – regardless of their social economic constitution, their membership in Alliances, their placement among neutrals and non-allies;
2. It allows all to make their own contributions;

¹ Archive Record: ASDMAECI, CSCE, b. 14, Discorsi Ministri

3. It accepts the principle of equality among all participating countries.

The rule of consensus in approving decisions allows all states to effectively express their aspirations and advocate their interests. This is evidenced by the significant contribution made to the Preliminaries by neutral and non-aligned countries. This finding is not intended to be merely a tribute to uncommitted countries. It indicates, with the eloquence of facts, that they are an essential part of European life. In Europe, the balance of fear must be replaced by the balance of trust. Therefore, it is necessary to promote, with loyalty and courage, a new peaceful development of relations between the governments and peoples of Europe, taking into account the interests of each.

Today the conditions exist for these goals to be achieved. It depends on us, on our political will, which must express with honesty and clarity the general aspiration for civil coexistence and cooperation among our peoples. We must not forget that the Conference is only an instrument that can facilitate more open and trusting relations: only a means so that dialogue among all European countries, united by many common aspirations, can lead to a better technical-legal arrangement. Peace, security, and cooperation among the peoples of Europe depend above all on our authentic and mature democratic consciousness; they depend on our ability to interpret the great historical moment we are living together and to demonstrate, with deeds, that our devotion to our individual homelands does not prevent us from respecting and cooperating with other peoples, rejecting the ever-renewing temptations to resort to force or fraud. In this way we shall continue, in new forms, the path opened to the progress of peoples by the great social transformations; and we shall give substantial and democratic content to our Conference, freeing it from the dangers of conformity and formalism.

Our Conference will also serve to give the peoples of the other Continents the image of a Europe open to their initiatives and ready for co-operation.

Mr. President, the work accomplished in recent months has been very useful, and we must be grateful to the Finnish Government, which has provided our delegations with a favourable environment for constructive work.

The recommendations drawn up in the Helsinki Preliminaries will enable the Conference to arrive at resolutions likely to advance détente, in security, so as to make life richer in relations between our peoples and among our states, in every area of activity.

A decisive contribution to détente is brought by the commitment to the renunciation of any action involving the use or threat of force or pressure of any kind against the independence or free choices of each people; and by the consequent recognition of the inviolability of borders. From this fundamental concept-in which the sovereignty of states over their territorial integrity is embodied-we must find inspiration for our political relations. Therefore, it will be good to reconfirm - in their present formulation - the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and elaborated in the Declaration on Friendly Relations. The recognition of the inviolability of borders - we wish to make this clear - cannot prejudice any of the free choices of states towards associative forms, of which the European Union is the most prominent manifestation.

This European Union is not only a political and economic construction and reality; if it is not yet a permanent plebiscite of consciences and wills, it is certainly a dynamic and open reality that, as it consolidates, will strengthen peace and security for all.

Mr. President, in our quest for political security, the military aspect remains essential. Military détente, to be effective, requires general and complete disarmament measures, which, while always in our hopes, cannot be limited to our Continent. We can, however, begin by adopting measures of goodwill suitable for increasing confidence among European states; such are, for example, the prior notification of military manoeuvres and movements. The indivisibility of peace issues draws our attention to the Mediterranean aspects of European security. In particular, it is necessary to take into account the relations between regions that, although belonging to different Continents, form a historically and geographically united area. Therefore, contributions of ideas from non-European Mediterranean states will be of relevant interest. From their communications we will be able to learn how they intend to cooperate with us. We believe that the success of the European Conference - and the experience we will have gained through it - will enable the initiation of a similar Conference for the Mediterranean.

Mr. President, European security must find its firmest foundation in cooperation among peoples. Therefore, we must show practicality in proposing the measures designed to ensure it. Precisely because it is not treaties but men who make peace or war. I would like to emphasize the decisive importance of freer movement of people, increasing cultural cooperation of greater exchange of information and genuine exchange of ideas. If men can meet each other, trust and security will be strengthened. In this way we will be able to say that we have taken a new step forward on the path of *détente*. The documents of the Helsinki Preliminaries provide only a few cautious indications in this regard. I hope that in the course of the Conference measures can be worked out to facilitate contacts and meetings between the citizens of the states we represent here. There are many proposals to be made in this regard: there comes naturally to mind a less stingy dissemination of newspapers, books and, above all, information through radio and television. In this regard, we will present some proposals related to marriages between citizens of different states, dissemination of information, promotion of tourism, cooperation in the field of environment, exchange of experiences on educational methods and teaching texts.

This year in Italy we worthily celebrated, together with France and Poland, the fifth centenary of the birth of Nicholas Copernicus. The Polish scientist, in his free wanderings through Europe, offers us a shining example of how we can be enriched by participating in the life of different nations.

We think that the happy proposal put forward by Federal Germany to establish a European Forum or Academy of Sciences should be expanded to include the Humanities and the Arts, and should be articulated into Sections, to be placed in the different countries in relation to their vocations. We are aware of the difficulties presented by the search for the point where the freedom of the individual must stop in order to enable the State, in compliance with laws, to guarantee the life of the nation; but these difficulties must not prevent us from putting every effort into the search for a model of society in which the fundamental freedoms of the citizen are respected.

Mr. President, in the same spirit we must address the problems posed by economic development and technical and scientific progress. The Honourable Foreign Minister of Denmark has outlined the tasks

that the European Economic Community can perform to increase trade thus helping to ensure a long period of intense economic development and social progress for all the countries of Europe.

The recommendations contained in the Preliminaries and approved by us also indicate the methods to be followed so that our cooperation can gain new momentum. Much will depend on the initiative of enterprises to implement new projects or explore new possibilities for exchange; but it is up to governments to help determine the concrete conditions for this to happen. It is not so much a matter of dwelling on principles as of operating so that contacts between enterprises, entrepreneurs and workers' unions are facilitated by regulations and encouraged by political and trade union bodies.

In this way we will be able to continue to extend with certain benefit to all participating countries an already relevant cooperation, to which Italy has also made its tangible contribution. The measures we propose aim precisely at this goal. The Conference will also have to address the new problems that preoccupy our peoples threatened by the increasing pollution of water and the atmosphere and in general, by the degradation of the environment in which we live. To this end – and also for reasonable proposals to take over the current phase of inconclusive “ecological sermons” – political agreements must be concluded, in order to avoid serious environmental imbalances, which affect the same economic balances and therefore international trade. In other words, soil protection. The regulation of water and the fight against its pollution must be the subject of a coordinated European policy.

Mr. President, if we let our work be inspired by these practical and constructive concepts, we will be doing something useful for all peoples. Today the essential thing is to achieve objectives that will bring about a further significant advance in détente and cooperation in Europe. Tomorrow it will be the conduct of our work itself that will identify the most suitable means of continuing it.

The Italian government is pleased that détente has made relevant progress that finds its evident demonstration precisely in this great European meeting, and arises from a growing understanding and greater mutual trust; but this is not enough. We are convinced that there are further opportunities of strengthening security to enrich cooperation; to multiply our contacts. These are the possibilities to be explored by

5 JULY 1973

rejecting, as far as humanly possible, the ever-resurgent spectre of mistrust. It is not a question of restoring Europe's primacy over other continents, but of reaffirming its responsibility in the face of the greatest problems of peace and development. The Conference must be for concreteness and adherence to reality, the starting point towards new goals. Only in this way can we respond to our peoples' expectations of peace, freedom and progress.

1 AUGUST 1975

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS ALDO MORO AT THE CSCE SUMMIT
IN HELSINKI

The Italian Government welcomes with satisfaction the final phase of this Conference, which for almost two years has gathered the delegations of our countries in a task which has been persevering, taxing and at times difficult. Their work has always been guided by the common desire to understand each other and by the awareness of the common responsibilities which such a vast enterprise entails.

This is the first time that 33 European countries, together with two North American countries which are particularly close to us, have gathered together with the aim of defining the common ground for their unity and, as far as possible, of enlarging the scope of their co-operation in all fields. Our history unites us in spite of everything. We are united by our striving towards peace, free from any threat to our security. We are united by the necessity and the desire for co-operation. The awareness of all these factors in favour of unity has opened the way to détente. But Italy has always been convinced that it was necessary to give a new and more substantial content to the gradual and not always easy process of détente, even beyond the necessary agreements between governments -in other words, the enhancement of the ideals of freedom and justice, an ever more effective protection of human rights, the enrichment of peoples through a better mutual understanding, freer contacts, and an ever-broader circulation of ideas and information. That is the theme of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Naturally, such a wide enterprise cannot be carried out in a short time. Therefore, we did not come to this Conference with the illusion that it would constitute the final stage of this favourable evolution or that it could provide the answer to all questions and the solution to all problems. None the less the Conference in itself represents a step forward along the path towards détente, which in the past was

characterized by bilateral initiatives and agreements. It resulted instead in the calling of the multilateral meeting on the basis of parity in order to work together, without distinction as to the contribution of each country, which, from the greatest to the smallest, has made its voice heard. The phrasing of the documents implies a consensus which may at times be difficult but must be unanimous. The principle of consensus remains, along with that of equality, a permanent acquisition and a fundamental starting point on the way to détente.

If what we are accomplishing today is an important step forward, it is being accomplished in the awareness of the importance of differences in ideological and political, economic and social structures. At the same time, however, we derive encouragement from the awareness of the fact that a common desire to live in peace and to enhance our relations has led us to seek favourable points of agreement. Much work certainly remains to be done, but we have already laid the basis of the possible future recommended stages of this development.

The Final Act that we are about to sign is not, therefore, a notarial document limited to a temporary situation. It certainly takes into account the existing territorial order and the fundamental prospects of co-operation, but as far as we are concerned it is intended to be chiefly a gateway to the future. We have attempted to recognize, without however crystallizing, reality. We have endeavoured to work in a dynamic context in order to keep open the way to a peaceful evolution of relations amongst our States, in accordance with the free will of peoples. We therefore consider the results achieved today as a step in the right direction.

We have been able to reaffirm a certain number of fundamental principles of international coexistence which are universally valid. Respect for and strict application of such principles are the essential conditions for the harmonious development of relations between States on an equal and lasting basis. Among those principles I should like to recall respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; co-operation among States; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-recourse to the use of force; the inviolability of frontiers while preserving the lawfulness of frontier changes in conformity with international law, through peaceful means and by agreements.

I am talking about commitments concerning specific measures which are not limited to the principles of détente but are bound to transform themselves into facts. Such commitments are obviously proportioned to the will of each State consciously to undertake and respect them. Although not of a juridical nature, they are based on political and moral responsibility and must therefore be carried out by all, in good faith and without reservations. It is by such implementation - and also through the meeting scheduled for 1977 - that the will of each government to contribute effectively to the improvement in international relations will be measured. This concerns the application of measures in the field of security, but in a much broader and more articulate manner, it concerns those sectors of co-operation which have been recognized as bearing a particular importance and which concern economy, culture, information, contacts between people and education.

The spirit with which we adhere to these commitments is the same spirit which will guide us in our relations with all the other countries, and particularly with the countries belonging to an area which is especially close to Italy for obvious reasons of geographical proximity, cultural affinity and a broad range of common interests: the Mediterranean.

It is with particular satisfaction that we welcome the fact that the Conference has permitted us to highlight the close ties that unite security and co-operation in Europe to security and co-operation in the Mediterranean. We have played an active part in the drafting of a document which specifically concerns this area. Our specific commitment in our relations with the non-participating States will be guided by the principles laid down by the CSCE in developing co-operation in various fields.

It is within this framework of a dynamic perspective and an enrichment of the very fabric of political and human relations that, as Chairman of the Council of the European Communities, I would like to recall the declaration made in Helsinki on 3 July, 1973 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark on behalf of the European Communities. Mr. Andersen drew the attention of his colleagues to the fact that, according to the subjects, the Communities could be involved, in conformity with their competences and internal procedures, in the work of the Conference and that the implementation of the results of the negotiations on these subjects would depend on the agreement of the Communities. The

latter have considered the conclusions of the Conference on these matters and I have the honour to inform you that these have been accepted.

Consequently, I shall sign the Final Act of the Conference in my dual capacity: as representative of Italy and as President in office of the Council of the Communities respectively. Third countries will have the assurance therefore that the conclusions of this Conference will be applied by the Communities in all matters which are within their competence, or which may come within their competence in future. As regards these matters, the expression "Participating States", mentioned in the Final Act, is to be considered therefore as applicable also to the European Communities. As for the implementation of the conclusions of the Conference, the points of view of the Communities will be expressed in accordance with their internal rules each time a matter within their competence is involved.

I would like to recall that in terms of economic and social development, and also with a view to greater and improved international economic relations, the European Communities have already made a significant contribution to the objectives of this Conference. The Member States of the European Communities, recalling the evolving nature of their institutions, consider that the results of the Conference will not provide a hindrance to the process of European integration which they intend freely to pursue. This process, which is a factor of peace and security, constitutes a positive contribution to the development of co-operation in Europe. The Member States intend to continue together to co-operate with all participating countries in order to achieve this objective.

The cohesion of the nine countries of the European Communities has proved useful in the work of the Conference and this is indeed a constructive contribution in trying to find points of common agreement with the participating States. In fact, it is a testimony to the open spirit with which these countries intend to continue their multilateral dialogue for the purpose of détente, peace and co-operation.

The CSCE has offered its 35 participants a very fruitful area of work. The documents which will be solemnly signed will provide Governments with a measure of trust which will be enhanced through timely and far-sighted implementation and will be a considerable contribution to relations between European peoples at all levels. It is therefore clear

that the validity of the multilateral dialogue will be judged by the capacity to meet the expectations of all the people, and in particular to fulfil the hopes of the new generations.

We must not disappoint them in their expectations but act in a spirit of peace, justice, understanding and loyalty to make our principles felt and to achieve their benefits.

The diversity of inspiration and experience that has been gained from our work will achieve greater results in each country and this will in fact achieve a greater measure of success in terms of the progress of mankind.

7 OCTOBER 1977

STATEMENT BY THE UNDERSECRETARY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS LUCIANO RADI AT THE PREPARATORY MEETING
IN BELGRADE

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should wish to express too, the inaugural good wishes of my Government for the launching of this Belgrade Meeting, which is the first meeting of the representatives of 35 countries signatory to the Final Act. The Final Act is a document which has characteristics and features which are unique in the relations between all our countries, opening up vast prospects for our commitment and for the hopes and creativity, particularly of the rising generation.

I would wish at the same time to express to the Yugoslav Government the more lively appreciation for making available, since the Preparatory Meeting last summer, all the facilities necessary for our work, and offering such warm hospitality and such ready and efficient co-operation.

This new appointment is a further proof of the vitality of Europe, we think, now endorsed by the positive re-establishment in some of the European countries of democratic institutions, making easier and more fruitful the dialogue among the States of the continent, throwing light on the irreplaceable values of the democratic pluralist systems. Today, looking back after a tormented history of war and confrontation, we see that a period has now started in the last few years, where, thanks to the establishment and to the maintaining of a situation of equilibrium, at last we are assured a situation of stability. This could have led some of the European States to cultivate, each in its own political, social, economic context, a close prospect within its own system, thereby determining on the continent a static, sterile situation. On the contrary, equilibrium and stability have formed the frame in which the citizens of our countries have more and more intensely pursued an effort for contacts and dialogue and their Governments have been prompted to discuss among themselves principles inspiring their relations, to explore all possible means to improve the safeguarding of security and to enlarge the

means of co-operation in the various fields where co-operation is fruitfully developing.

This second path was chosen, and this led to the adoption of the Final Act formulated and approved in absolute equality by the 35 participating States, making it possible to codify a great number of principles destined to guide our conduct. We therefore see the Final Act as the creation of a code of behaviour for each one of our countries in all the fields it covers. Diversity among the countries of Europe remains as to the political and social principles adopted. Ideological differences remain, but we have introduced the principle of dialogue and the search for more articulated forms of contact. In this way we think there has been set up the code of the will of our peoples to live together in harmony, the code of *détente*.

The provisions of the Final Act have indeed identified many of the necessary elements for the fruitful development of co-operation and security in Europe. Furthermore, there emerges from it the close bond existing between these two dimensions, security and co-operation, and as the first cannot be based solely on military balance, but requires to be true and lasting, also an increased converging of interests and a deepening of the dialogue among the countries and peoples of the continent.

This position reflects the constant conviction of the Italian Government that *détente* should constitute a global indivisible process. It should develop in a balanced, progressive way in its multiple contents, political, economic, ideological and in human and cultural relations.

The success of this Meeting, which is backward-looking and at the same time projected towards the future, will depend mainly on the constructive spirit with which the participating States will inspire their action throughout. We are not called upon in this assembly to re-write the Final Act a second time, we are called upon, on the contrary, to endorse its validity and facilitate its future implementation.

The Belgrade exercise should in no way prejudice either textually or in interpretation the provisions of the Final Act. This remains, to our mind, a solid balanced basis for every further step forward on the road to co-operation and *détente* in Europe. Because the shortcomings and the shadows we still notice in the above-mentioned road are not due to the formulation of the Final Act, but to failures or incompleteness of its carrying out.

Therefore, in the course of our work we shall have to keep the Final Act in the centre of our attention and abstain from initiatives which could possibly reduce its authority. We are convinced that, to this end, we should proceed without any complacency, with the necessary openness and sincerity, to carry out a detailed, thorough examination of the many subjects contained in the various chapters of the Final Act. It is the task of this Meeting to carry out this examination: the Italian delegation reserves its right to enter analytically into it during the general debate. At this phase of our work we shall restrict ourselves to formulating some preliminary considerations. From the beginning the Italian Government has been convinced that full implementation of the requirements of the Final Act would be a long-lasting process, certainly destined to become increasingly demanding after the initial phase, and, therefore, that it would have been an error to seek to set too high goals for the near future. At the same time, the Italian Government was, and remains, convinced that even in this short period between Helsinki and today, more significant progress in the implementation of the Final Act could have been carried out. Therefore, it will be essential that in the future political will to operate in this way should be the unanimous concern of all the 35 signatory States.

Italy expressed, when signing the Final Act, the will to carry out in good faith and unreservedly the provisions it contains. The Italian Government acted in conformity with this declaration of intent. Italy is furthermore a country where laws and regulations, even before Helsinki, were fully guided by the ideals and concepts which were subsequently sanctioned and endorsed by the Final Act. An example of such conduct, which I think it is appropriate to recall on this occasion, is represented by the signature and ratification of the Osimo agreements by which the Governments of Rome and Belgrade gave implementation to a certain number of principles universally valid of international relations, the respect and application of which are an essential condition for the dialogue among all our States, and not only those belonging to different political systems, but for all of them to be able to develop in an advantageous way and on a just and permanent basis.

I would stress that for the Italian Government such principles have equal value and must be interpreted in the light of their close interdependence. As is well known, in concluding the above-mentioned agreements the

Italian Government acted also in the conviction that they would contribute to a consistent defence of peace and international order, setting the premises for the continuation and deepening of co-operation between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Italian Government is well aware of having acted in conformity with a fundamental objective of détente, according to which frontiers should not represent a factor of division between peoples and individuals, but their meeting point, not a borderline of national communities, but their natural opening to the world abroad.

I would also add that Italy has almost completed the legislative procedure of ratifying the two international covenants on human rights and the optional protocol to the covenant on political and civil rights, which provide for the possibility of the individual having recourse against violations of his rights. Indeed, we are convinced that the international community should focus its attention beyond any institutional structure on the individual, and that the individual should finally be the actual subject of every system of guarantees among States. This requirement is being constantly more broadly recognized by public opinion throughout the world.

As problems and risks on the international level do not only arise from tensions between States, but also from conflicts and contradictions between individuals, groups and institutions, the requirement for greater protection of human rights is particularly felt. As is well known, Italy, together with the other States members of the European Community, is party to treaties and agreements which in many sectors provide for a growing transfer of national competences to the Community's institutions. It follows automatically that some tasks inherent in the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act are in the domain of the Community's sphere. To our mind this reflects a basic criterion of political coherence.

We are sure that the design of the European union that the nine countries of the Community pursue as a fundamental political option for the creation of a new reality, more adequate to the present requirements of cooperation and international balance, can but enrich and make more efficient the development of cooperation in Europe.

As a Mediterranean country, Mr. Chairman, we consider the chapter of the Final Act concerning questions of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean of great importance. This area, which is closely

connected with our continent, not only from the geographical point of view, has political, economic and cultural characteristics, ancient and new ones, which make it of basic importance for world balance. We have most positively assessed the results of the Preparatory Meeting in Belgrade, which enable also the non-participating Mediterranean countries to make their contribution both in plenary and in the relevant subsidiary working body. It is because we are aware of how many-faceted and complex the problems concerning the Mediterranean are, that we are convinced that we, all of us here, should do our utmost to contribute positively to the further development of relations and of the dialogue which has begun with the non-participating Mediterranean States.

Mr. Chairman, the overall picture of what has been implemented in the two years that have elapsed since the signing of the Final Act presents without doubt some positive aspects, even if there remain some darker aspects. Results achieved in some sectors and, even more, ferments which have emerged and developed thanks to the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, allow us to hope that there may be a constructive and realistic continuation of the dialogue seeking to correct and improve the present, and to circumscribe those fields and areas where cooperation on the continent may be further deepened and extended.

As regards the principles, certainly the signatory countries to the Act have made an effort to conform to them, and indeed peace on our continent is being consolidated, but certainly, too, in this field, more could be done. The Final Act itself, which refers to a limited geographic area, however, recognizes the close link existing between peace and security in Europe and throughout the world, and it is indeed on the other continents that have been intensified in recent times, dangerous tensions and confrontations. These events risk harming those conditions of universality which, in a world like the modern world, where the destiny of the peoples becomes more and more interdependent, are necessary to enjoy true and lasting peace. Referring once again to these principles, we think that a more adequate assertion and a more extensive respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, may contribute, according to the words of the Final Act, to the development of friendly relations and cooperation among our States. Omissions and negative behaviour which may still be noted in the implementation of the Seventh Principle

are not, in our mind, in conformity with the pursuance of these fundamental objectives. We shall continue to work for their realization, convinced of their importance for an effective development of the process of détente.

Measures aimed to strengthen security, indicated in the Final Act, represent, in our mind, a promising beginning for further positive developments in this field. It is certainly with satisfaction, that we acknowledged the action taken in this respect by many participating countries. We strongly wish that the example indicated by the signatory States who voluntarily extended the scope may represent a useful precedent. The Final Act itself states that the experience derived from carrying out of confidence-building measures will suggest the most suitable way to pursue their development and extension. This meeting seems to us the most appropriate forum to recognize that the experience accomplished can stimulate us to explore further the military aspects of security. We also consider that the cooperation in the fields of economy, in spite of many difficulties met with in recent times by many countries, ours among them, has marked progress on our continent. But also in this field we could act to facilitate the necessary contacts on all levels, through the prompt publication of the necessary information of an economic and commercial nature, and the streamlining of procedures that are often too bureaucratic. The indications in the Final Act referring to the Second Basket show ways to progress which we must continue to pursue, leaving out no single possibility which could enable us all to draw therefrom concrete and effective advantages.

The Chapter of the Final Act, Mr. Chairman, which is dedicated to cooperation in the humanitarian field presents, to our mind, indications and a content which by providing ample possibilities for progress, endorse and enhance the dynamic nature of the CSCE process. The 35 countries of the CSCE should respond in real terms to this appeal. It is the requirement of an increasingly deep and widespread opinion which, in its growing intensity, can no longer be limited to a mere humanitarian aspect. To recognize this requirement and its political substance, is an act of realism, even if divergencies as to the way of satisfying it, are still great. Consequently, in the mutual respect for our institutions and our systems, a deeper attention and a greater commitment must take place

so that we may, as the Final Act wishes, obtain a more free circulation of ideas and individuals.

Some progress has been made in contacts among individuals, but there is still a vast field in which a more open and efficient action can be developed by all the States participating, to eliminate obstacles and barriers which still exist. At the same time more results must be pursued in cooperation in the fields of culture and education. In particular the provision of the Final Act concerning family reunification, marriages among citizens of different countries, and, more generally, the freedom of movement of the individual, to our mind, require more ample and more liberal implementation. In the same way, a more liberal circulation of ideas and information should be pursued. This not only for ideological reasons, but to prepare us to assimilate those aspects of scientific progress which represent an objective factor. The world keeps growing smaller and the forces of history are drawing it, although in the dialects of the systems, towards an organic unity.

The broader possibilities of information connected with the rapid technological progress reducing the effective power of control by the public authorities of individual states should be correlated to institutions which are a more adequate expression of the new levels of scientific knowledge and of conditions of men; otherwise they will lead to negative consequences. We are convinced that progress of this type may contribute to create, thanks to a better mutual knowledge a climate of growing trust, consequently, a strengthening of *détente*. Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Chairman, we are fully aware of the importance of this Meeting of ours, which, although held on a different level from that of the previous Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, represents an element of its continuity, and thus endorses the moral and political commitment to which we solemnly subscribed in Helsinki. Thus, we are approaching this further step towards the strengthening of security and cooperation in Europe, well aware of the importance of the mandate entrusted to us by our Governments and thus, by our peoples, both of them equally the receivers and active subjects of the developments – which we trust will be positive – in the relations between all the signatory States. The delegations here present may rest assured that the Italian delegation will participate, in a spirit of cooperation and with the

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greatest commitment, in all constructive efforts in this Meeting, in full knowledge of the scope that our work will have for the strengthening of peace and security in Europe.

11 NOVEMBER 1980

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EMILIO COLOMBO AT THE PREPARATORY MEETING
IN MADRID

Mr. Chairman, I would like, on behalf of the Italian Government, to express the deepest gratitude to the Spanish Government for the hospitality offered to us in this great city and for the unsparing political and organizational endeavours that have gone into the preparation of this Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Italy sincerely hopes that Madrid will be another important milestone in the process deriving from the Helsinki Final Act. That document not only marked an historic moment in the lives of the thirty-five signatory nations but contains within itself all the elements needed to stimulate the development of security and co-operation in an area of such great political, economic and cultural importance as Europe. It is a document which Italy regards as being of the highest value, since it addresses itself both to States and to individuals, and, through the principles it enunciates, represents a challenge and a stimulus for all the countries of the world.

Mr. Chairman, it gives me particular pleasure to be here today to testify, at what is certainly not an easy moment in international affairs, to the importance which Italy has from the outset attached to this Madrid Meeting, as a significant element in that CSCE process which is in itself a fundamental aspect of détente. There is no alternative to détente if relations among States are not to develop in a climate of instability fraught with grave dangers.

During this year, in the course of which so many elements of disturbance and danger have been introduced into international life, we have looked forward to this meeting as a forum in which the troubled atmosphere could be expected to clear and the interrupted dialogues to resume. In our view, the dialogue needed to be resumed on the basis of a frank and detailed examination of the possible reasons for the difficulties that had arisen, and above all, a search for specific measures and decisions

which should be taken in order to reactivate the détente process at a higher and more securely established level. We were therefore bewildered, and indeed bitterly disappointed, when what in fact occurred was a series of procedural discussions and manoeuvres, which left us in doubt as to whether they were invariably inspired by a desire to guarantee the success of the main Meeting or whether they did not perhaps have a more sinister purpose: to disrupt the meeting and distort the significance of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Mr. Chairman, the balance between all the sections of the Final Act constitutes the most appropriate framework for the purpose of enabling our countries and our citizens successfully to pursue their efforts at achieving fuller dialogue and broader contacts, and hence at consolidating the prospects of development of the détente process. In this context, what can and should be expected of each of us, as signatories of the Final Act, is a coherent implementation of all the principles and provisions it contains, as a necessary premise for the further fruitful development of our security and co-operation.

The Final Act embodies what we consider a most valuable achievement, the undertaking that the diversity of political and economic systems existing in our geographical region shall not be a source of intolerance in our mutual relations, but that those relations shall reflect the common determination to achieve a constructive encounter. And the CSCE does in fact provide a framework which highlights the historical and cultural roots that are, to a greater or lesser extent, common to us all.

Unfortunately, however, performance in recent years has fallen short of these ideas and aims which the Helsinki Final Act enjoins us to pursue not only in our own body of thirty-five States but also in our relations with other States throughout the world. Mutual suspicions and the attempt to modify existing balances to one's own advantage have increased distrust rather than confidence, in contrast with the undertaking solemnly subscribed at Helsinki.

There has taken place the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, in violation of numerous principles of the Final Act, which are all and in all respects in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and whose validity *erga omnes* cannot therefore be in the slightest doubt. Italy is aware that the shadows cast by the events in Afghanistan continue to weigh heavily on this Meeting and on the resumption of the

process of détente in Europe. I have felt it my duty to make this point directly not only here but in the conversations which I had in Moscow with the leaders of the USSR on 10 and 11 November last.

There have been and continue to be throughout the world, even in countries signatories of the Final Act, grave violations of human rights and of the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion and belief. Italy has repeatedly and unequivocally condemned these violations, in the full conviction and awareness of the importance that the humanitarian dimension must have, at least for participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. There needs to be, on the part of all our countries, a deeper commitment to the cause of human rights, inasmuch as man is not fully protected if his dignity is not accorded concrete respect in all its aspects. In truth, the word democracy is meaningless unless it involves, first and foremost, respect for man in his integrity as an individual. This reference to the negative aspects is not made out of any desire to engage in polemics. It is our duty to stress, frankly and sincerely, that it is not possible to build a future on the basis of ideas that are solemnly reflected in the principles and provisions of the Final Act but not in reality.

The eminent scientists from all our countries who met at the CSCE "Scientific Forum" in Hamburg from 18 February to 3 March this year drew the conclusion that respect for human rights and fundamental freedom on the part of all States represents a key factor in any significant improvement in their mutual relations.

An entreaty of the highest moral value was addressed to our Heads of State in the message sent to them on 1 September last by Pope John Paul II with specific reference to this Meeting, in which he referred to the duty of each country signatory to the Helsinki Final Act to respect those human rights and fundamental freedoms that are enshrined in the principles of the Final Act itself. The papal message confirms with the full weight of its authority that there are still, alas, numerous shortcomings in the implementation of such principles.

Mr. Chairman, public opinion - which in Italy is adequately echoed by all political forces and by Parliament, and hence by the Government which I have the honour to represent here - takes the liveliest and most urgent interest not only in matters relating to human rights and the humanitarian dimension but also in the problems of military security on

our continent. Equally lively is the interest displayed in trade union, industrial and business circles in the achievement of progress within the framework of the economic, scientific and technological component of the Final Act. My country also naturally takes a precise and specific interest in the necessary development of the chapter of the Final Act relating to the Mediterranean.

Such expectations and interests are natural in a country that belongs to the European Community and attaches the highest importance to its membership of that body in terms of political solidarity, integration in a wider economic area, active contribution to the endeavours to unify our continent and to open up all the various possibilities of collaboration both within Europe and with countries in other parts of the world. They are also natural for a country which, like Italy, is a member of the Atlantic Alliance and is permanently prepared to make its contribution to reducing the balance of forces and armaments to progressively lower levels, especially inasmuch as the alliance to which it belongs is defensive also as regards the make up and deployment of its forces.

It is in the light of such specific political considerations and of the requirements of balance between the new developments in the various sectors that, just as we could not agree to limit this Meeting to the evaluation of performance, it would be equally impossible for us to restrict its task to the preparation of a further *ad hoc* conference on European security and excluding other themes of fundamental importance. The proposals which Italy, in close connexion with the other countries of the European Community intends to submit in the course of this Meeting, will reflect this view of what is meant by balance.

In this connexion, Mr. Chairman, I would refer first of all to the military aspects of European security which for my government is of vital importance. It is clear that the Final Act in referring to these subjects has set the stage for considerable preventive action in terms of military manoeuvres and the possibility of notifying about military manoeuvres is a positive fact and this is of course of common interest in promoting disarmament and improving our political and military aspect of security in correlation with security in the Mediterranean and Europe at the same time and this is in the interests of all participating states on the basis of sovereign equality. Italy is ready to bring to bear the necessary efforts in order to achieve greater stability and security in Europe

and to reduce the risks of misunderstanding and conflict. We think that a whole number of measures flow from the Final Act of Helsinki which are of course exacting, both politically and in the military sense. If we could achieve a satisfactory application of measures directed at confidence building measures, let us hope that we shall find a better balance between the measures and the subject of disarmament.

Italy suggests that at this meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe that we discuss the mandate for convening a meeting specified in November 1979 in the Declaration of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the countries of the European Community that this should define the appropriate framework for confidence building measures to be verified and applied throughout the European continent. This is not only the basis for a qualitative leap in C.B.M. but also is a mandate for an ad hoc conference on disarmament which we hope for. We should be in a position to show to our public opinion a determination to achieve significant progress in an area which is so complex as the one of military security, creating the necessary conditions in order to go on to specific measures of limitation and reduction in armaments. The realization of such prospects would strengthen security in Europe and would give, together with other relevant decisions in all the other sectors, a new impulse in the process of détente.

Mr. Chairman, in facing the vast subject of the second Basket of the Final Act, which represents the very important ingredients of balance which was laboriously achieved, I would like to stress that Italy, together with the other countries of the European Committee, to which many of its powers have been bestowed, which it had exercised earlier before the Treaty of Rome itself, it recommends that the participating states, in the interests of co-operation and in commerce, industry and science, that it should recognize implicitly that economic co-operation represents the fundamental element of détente.

The diversity of systems and commercial and economic structures has not prevented considerable and growing development in trade in Europe and co-operation in the scientific and technical field. The growing bonds of an economic kind have made it possible to provide considerable credit and technological transfers and technological "know-how" and an improvement in the standard of living of the populations in the countries concerned, and new forms of co-operation are being

developed in the light of the Helsinki Agreement and this co-operation is seen in industry in spite of ideological barriers, creating new and permanent bonds with reciprocal benefits to all.

In the light of such positive evolution we have to note, however, certain flaws in the application of some of the basic provisions of the Second Basket in connection with economic information and commercial information in regard to business contacts for the facilitation of smaller and medium sized firms and enterprises, and there are new obstacles being created in the development and effectiveness of trade. It is within our intentions to promote in all possible ways the intensification of relations which have been noted so far in the various areas and leading to specific progress.

With regard to the various problems which beset the world economy, and in connection with the Final Act, which refers to the interdependency of world economy, we need to promote international economic relations of an equitable and stable nature which were considered through the continuous economic development and diversification in all countries. And this requires of all participating states the co-operation in an orderly development of economic co-operation and that they should assume the necessary responsibility in order to transfer the necessary resources to the newer developing countries.

Mr. Chairman, as a Mediterranean country, we consider that the greatest interest should be brought to bear on the chapter of the Final Act which concerns this particular area, which is subject to a very precarious balance and could lead to major repercussions if upset. The meeting of Belgrade referred to the Mediterranean in two parts of its concluding document. In the first, relating to co-operation in the Mediterranean, it has had certain repercussions at the Meeting of Experts in Valetta and certain results have been achieved, which will have to be considered within the framework of implementations and decisions taken. The second one was relegated to the Madrid Meeting and would require further discussion in connection with security in the Mediterranean. While aware that the tackling of such problems on which the countries concerned are divided with regard to the status of the Final Act, some of which are signatories and some not, we must of course consider these problems in all seriousness, and we must consider co-operation in the Mediterranean as a major subject.

Five years have passed since Italy concluded an agreement with Yugoslavia, which may be an example to be followed with regard to the principles being applied of the Final Act. Until then, this had been a troubled area but now it is characterized by consolidated co-operation and friendship, and this is to the benefit of all concerned including the whole of the European Continent and the Mediterranean.

I would like to draw your attention to the agreement that has been concluded between Italy and Malta. Malta, which has declared itself as a neutral country. This is a status which is specifically sanctioned by the Final Act with regard to the inherent right of sovereignty. Such agreements are in accordance with the appropriate capital of the Final Act in connection with security and co-operation in the Mediterranean. We are aware of having worked in this sensitive area of the Mediterranean in accordance with the fundamental objectives of détente and in co-operation, reciprocal co-operation, for the sake of promoting security which is of course a fundamental principle.

Mr. Chairman, the Italian Government has always been convinced that the fullest implementation of the provisions of the Final Act would require a long-standing process but, even if we do not look high or too loftily in our ambitions, we note that certain shortcomings have occurred, be it for lack of conviction or vagueness in political will, or be it by omission with regard to the principles of the appropriate document in the Final Act. These omissions will certainly not help to give the necessary impulse to the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as a whole.

Within the framework of humanitarian co-operation we have to be courageous in our consideration of all that was done in the past in giving a new impulse to a balanced dynamic process started in Helsinki – we have to be fully serious – the rights of man require further attention, further commitment, in order to achieve greater freedom in movement both of ideas and individuals.

There must be extension of freedom of contact between the citizens of various countries and greater freedom in the movement of information, greater intensification of exchange of values and cultural values can only occur in the improvement of greater knowledge and reciprocal knowledge in a greater climate of confidence and this is the way to consolidate détente.

And it is in this context that we see a certain need for improvement in greater contacts between families, their re-unification and marriages. This of course refers also to the field of information and the improvement of the conditions of work of journalists. Progress has been very inadequate and it seems that we are moving backwards, we are regressing in fact, and journalists and their various organizations of information are subject to repression and it appears that they are refused the right to associate professionally in, as it happens in many of the participating states. More specifically, the Italian delegation has to draw the attention of the Conference on greater co-operation between our states, which is as required in order to achieve a greater equality of conditions of work of the workers, and migrant workers too, from all other countries. These workers are subject to the risk of being ignored, not understood, and struck at the very roots of their dignity and we must avoid their being sent home to their home countries after having contributed to economic progress of the country in which they work. This of course is connected with the greater occurrence of unemployment.

Mr. Chairman, the Italian Government is fully aware of the fundamental importance of the Final Act as an innovatory and dynamic element in the relations of both States and individuals in the thirty-five countries of our Conference, which are situated in an area so important for the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of co-operation and security. We are not unaware of the difficulties that lie ahead of us. They can be overcome only by a specific act of political will and a joint effort on the part of all the countries represented here. We must also realize that, while public opinion in our countries is aware of the difficulty of our task, it will nevertheless judge us on the basis of the results achieved. Only if these results are substantial, balanced and in conformity with the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act can they guarantee that continuity of the CSCE process without which the process would be condemned to immobility and hence to sterility. That was certainly not what was in the minds of the thirty-five Heads of State and Government who, five years ago at Helsinki, solemnly appended their signatures to a document of historic importance; nor was it in the minds and hopes of our peoples.

Still less did we or our peoples expect that we should find ourselves at this Conference still without having reached a decision on a further

meeting of the same type to be held at a similar interval to that which elapsed between Helsinki and Belgrade and between Belgrade and Madrid. In this connexion, it is my duty to declare today that Italy is in favour of the development of the CSCE process and is therefore aware of the serious implications for détente and co-operation among our thirty-five countries of any moves to interrupt or curtail the implementation of the commitments entered into in the Helsinki Final Act.

31 JULY 1985

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GIULIO ANDREOTTI AT THE CSCE TENTH ANNIVERSARY
MEETING IN HELSINKI

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I too would like to express the gratitude of the Italian Government and mine personally for the warm hospitality afforded us here by the Finnish authorities and particularly to state our gratitude to the President of the Republic who honoured the opening session of this Meeting with his presence and his statement. At the same time may I be allowed to express our sincere appreciation to the Executive Secretariat which has done its utmost to organize this Meeting.

Mr. Chairman, we heard the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg speaking on behalf of the countries of the European Community and we would like to associate ourselves entirely with what he said. Therefore, the remarks that I will now make are to be considered as a further contribution on our part.

Ten years have elapsed since the Heads of State or Government of the European countries, together with the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada, arrived in this hospitable country to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. For Italy the Act was signed by Aldo Moro, the prominent statesman, whose life was taken from us by the enemies of freedom and democracy, but whose political and moral teachings we shall never forget. And this is yet another reason for our support and loyalty to its cause and contents.

Ten years may be a long time in political terms but they are certainly a short time for history. Indeed, that event was historical and not merely political, as witnessed by the widely recognized belief of all those who lived through it at that time and of all those who are presently working so that this event may be seen as a reversal of the trend in the relations between countries participating at the European level to maintain an equilibrium by

starting a gradual process aimed at establishing a more just and confident set of relations among our nations and within each of them.

One first remark which I deem significant: quite obviously the CSCE process embraces neither the whole complex of inter-European relations, nor that of East-West relations. Therefore, such a process, though having a bearing on the general atmosphere of these relations, is in turn subject to the restraints and stimuli stemming from their evolution. We believe that, in its normative and implementation developments, this process is threefold: as an instrument for dialogue, a code of conduct, and a programme of action. As an instrument for dialogue, we acknowledge that the follow-up of the Final Act is a particularly appropriate multilateral framework for contributing to the improvement of East-West relations. Indeed, the various negotiating forums set up during the development of the CSCE process (meetings of representatives and experts, forums, seminars and conferences) have provided a certain stability to the dialogue between our countries beyond the rigid array of opposing blocs. In this respect I would like to stress and acknowledge the irreplaceable role played by the neutral and non-aligned States of our continent. Finally, the CSCE has proved its positive effects in remaining open to all of us even when the crisis in East-West relations had led to the progressive blocking of most of the remaining channels of contact.

Both the Final Act and the Concluding Documents of the subsequent CSCE Follow-Up Meetings are also, as I said, codes of conduct designed to provide guidance not only for interstate relations among the signatory States but also for the behaviour of the latter vis-à-vis their own nationals. In this connection we believe that the attainment of greater mutual knowledge between Eastern and Western societies – which is the necessary prerequisite for the "rapprochement" fervently hoped for by us – may reasonably be expected to ensue from the progressive implementation of the provisions adopted by the thirty-five participating States.

Such improved East-West relations may be reached more easily by means of an innovative joint effort to set up a world programme of aid and assistance to development, characterized by an effectiveness which has always been lacking as East and West have approached the problem of the South with no co-ordination between them.

The Final Act of Helsinki and the numerous documents subsequently adopted by the thirty-five also represent a consistent programme of action. In my view this is a positive element, since it has not only stimulated the diffusion of the idea that our societies by and large share common objectives and interests, but it has also legitimized the demand to implement all parts of the programme. For the Final Act to turn into a meaningful international fact through its effects as well as its potential, it is necessary that the commitments undertaken in Helsinki and in the follow-up meetings do not remain a dead letter. This is a serious risk that we cannot ignore, because it is perceived as such by large sections of public opinion, who ask us and themselves how credible are the commitments freely undertaken by our countries. They also question the value of words which are not followed by actual and exact compliance with the commitments entered into.

Here I would like to point out that the Helsinki process does not bind our countries only among and between themselves, but also extends to other relationships with third countries. In fact, in the Final Act the participating States – and I quote – "declare their intention to conduct their relations with all other States in the spirit of the principles" contained in that Declaration. Consequently, while this Tenth Anniversary Meeting faces us with the imperative need to act more speedily and effectively in all the areas considered by the Final Act (thus finally giving decisive impetus to human rights we are also aware of the problems of other peoples, who also and equally suffer from family divisions, insecurity and limitations and constraints on their freedom, a typical example of which is undoubtedly the right to profess one's own religion.

But we know that this requires a certain realism. We do not expect to move too rapidly along the path indicated by the Final Act, rather through progressive achievements in respect of the identity of each and all our fellow-travellers. But as limited as the commitments so far undertaken may be – after long and complex negotiations – and restricted as those that we might patiently agree upon in the future may be, it is essential for all of us to be ready and willing to remain faithful to them. It is certainly possible to build slowly, but it is impossible to do so on sand. This is where we feel there is an irrevocable need for balance between normative and implementation action. But this need for balance must be repeated in the evolving symmetry of the fundamental elements

which make up the process initiated by the Final Act: the security of States, respect for human rights and co-operation in the economic, scientific and cultural fields. Of course, I refer to a substantial symmetry, not or at least not necessarily one of negotiating opportunities and rounds. This symmetry is adequately reflected in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting and also in the provisions contained in it and the range of subsequent meetings convened during the present stage up to the Vienna Meeting in the autumn of 1986. On the other hand, to achieve this symmetry is becoming increasingly problematic because of the unsatisfactory outcome of the recent Ottawa Meeting on Human Rights, which implicitly demonstrated the incapacity of the participants and the participating States to find common ground on which to progress further. We hope that this was only a transient phenomenon and that steps will soon be taken on these issues which are so important to us and which we consider necessary for further growth in the CSCE process. For this purpose, proposals have to be worked out and submitted to the follow-up meeting in Vienna. In other words, all the understandings that we were unable to achieve in Ottawa must be reached in the Austrian capital.

We are aware that the overall political climate is positively influenced by the balanced and mutually beneficial development of economic and trade relations, together with increased contacts and exchanges in the scientific and cultural fields. We therefore express our satisfaction at the positive results of the meetings held so far within the CSCE area relating to economic, scientific and cultural co-operation: the Scientific Forum of Hamburg, the Valletta Meeting and the Venice Seminar on Mediterranean Co-operation. As a consequence of all this we intend to contribute seriously and productively to the other meetings scheduled before Vienna, the Cultural Forum of Budapest and the Bern Meeting on Human Contacts.

It is the Italian view that special political interest is to be found in the work of the Conference on Confidence and Security-building Measures and Disarmament which is being held in Stockholm and which is an integral part of the CSCE process. We participate in the Conference with the utmost goodwill and open-mindedness. We expect this first phase of our work to yield results corresponding to the deep-felt need and hope of our peoples to live in conditions of increased

confidence. Hence these results should match the mandate adopted in Madrid for confidence and security measures, which are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable and to be implemented over the whole of the European continent so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or the use of force in international relations. Should such results be achieved, we are also ready to reaffirm such obligations in the most appropriate manner. In this way, conditions would be laid down in Stockholm for defining the modalities for transition to the second stage of the Conference by means of an appropriate mandate to be approved at a future follow-up meeting. Such a second phase would aim at opening negotiations on measures for the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe, leading to increased security for all at a lower level of opposing military confrontation.

Mr. Chairman, fully aware of the great effort yet to be made and the role it has to play, Italy looks to the future with hope, since it is impossible to ignore that the process of détente was one of the crucial aspects of East-West relations and thus of international stability and security. As such, this process has taken on a primary role in determining the future of our continent and the entire world. This is even more so today, at a time when the results of forthcoming international meetings may have a significant impact on the development of such relations. The Italian Government, through the extensive and satisfactory consultations characterizing the alliance it belongs to, has asserted the necessity and advisability of meeting at the highest level between the two major powers and has actively worked in this direction during frequent contacts with the capitals of the East.

It would be perhaps a little too optimistic to expect such meetings to produce miraculous results or rapid solutions to the numerous and complex problems of our times. However, what we can realistically expect is a concrete effort to fully or partially eliminate the misunderstandings which were at the root of tensions in recent years. Nonetheless, there is also a need to modify behaviour, mainly by respecting the system of international obligations currently in force, which has contributed to the deterioration of the climate of East-West relations. In my opinion, it is significant that the preliminary contacts at the political level for preparing the Summit Meeting should take place in parallel to this meeting, thereby reaffirming the validity of the process of détente,

albeit within the context of a realistic acknowledgement of the sometimes serious short-comings and gaps which have emerged from the experience of the last ten years.

The Italian Government has repeatedly expressed its satisfaction at the opening of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space disarmament, along with its support for the objectives of the ongoing talks. It deems it necessary to proceed promptly in Geneva to an evaluation, without prejudging the issues of the negotiating positions with a view to identifying the most effective way of ensuring the consolidation of the strategic stability which constitutes the real objective of the negotiations themselves. It would, however, be erroneous to confine the whole of East-West relations within the limits of a negotiation which, though major, does not cover all the complex issues at stake.

As a Mediterranean country, Italy cannot avoid mentioning the unsatisfactory situation existing in that region, the very matrix of our civilisation and vital to world and European equilibrium. Unfortunately, various tensions affect a sea that should unite the people living in the coastal states in a common effort. In the spirit of the UN Charter, Italy is constantly endeavouring with great commitment to ease and overcome such tensions.

Over the last ten years, inter-European relations have changed radically. Maybe the time has come to ask ourselves whether East-West relations and inter-European relations – which are a central aspect of the former – have so far developed upon a basis which no longer matches the characteristics and needs of our times. We believe that peoples, and above all the younger generation, expect from Governments even more constructive and joint answers and solutions. In a word, it is necessary to abandon the historically and technologically obsolete view of the exclusive jurisdiction of States over their internal affairs and the principle of non-interference. That is why we believe that events such as those that have recently marked the life of the European Community are positive contributions to the whole continent. I refer to the Iberian democracies that have at last joined the Community and to the relaunching, be it only dialectically, of the EEC process as outlined by the Milan Council. We have noted with satisfaction substantial modifications in the approach to the Community by our Eastern neighbours. These various issues, of course, will have to be further and thoroughly studied. The

recent French initiative on the technological research programme called EUREKA – which has also had wide repercussions and implications outside the EEC and which is a premise for the Technological Community – now a precise goal and objective pursued by the twelve EEC members – will certainly contribute to the building up of the spirit and reality of a more united and co-operative European continent.

To give us confidence in the validity of these joint projects it will suffice to consider the unparalleled scientific level attained and firmly maintained by a similar initiative – the European Nuclear Research Centre in Geneva. The School of Italian Physicists is proud of the contribution it has given to this Centre, which can be considered as an example for other branches of science and technology.

In this solemn gathering, which commemorates an enlightened, far-sighted and far-reaching historical event, this reference to science induces me to express a hope. Those who are entrusted with public office and governmental responsibilities must give more support, and not only technical support, to scientists and researchers, by promoting all opportunities to have them meet and by making them a reference and guidance point for the formulation of our medium- and long-term political plans. The courageous acknowledgment that science must proceed without frontiers and secrets is the greatest contribution to security and co-operation which could be made. This is an issue which has to be analysed, thoroughly studied and experienced without stopping before the tremendous difficulties which will have to be confronted and overcome. It is not science, but the Improper use of science, that creates the tragic premises of world destruction. Let Helsinki be the starting point of this hope for a genuine determination and resolve to pursue this bold and innovative approach.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude my statement with an Invitation to realism: realism in the awareness that it is not possible to retrace one's steps and reverse the process, realism in the belief that we cannot depart from the path laid out in the CSCE Final Act. And this is not simply because we are obliged to do so by the commitments entered into ten years ago by our Heads of State or Government, but also first and foremost because this is the will of our peoples. The deepest aspiration of all our peoples is the aspiration for peace and international co-operation and their deepest desire is for increased respect for the human

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person, for his individual and collective needs, for his freedoms and his rights, including that of ever more open and fruitful contact with his fellow men. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 NOVEMBER 1986

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GIULIO ANDREOTTI AT THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING
IN VIENNA

Mr. Chairman, first of all allow me to express to the Austrian authorities my personal gratitude and that of the Italian Government for the warm welcome extended to us here in this city which has had such an outstanding place in the history of Europe.

A little more than one year has elapsed since we last met in the Finnish capital to celebrate solemnly the Tenth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. Even in such a short period of time a number of events – some of which have been dramatic enough – have increased our awareness of the need to co-operate within the framework that brings us all and our countries together here today. This awareness should inspire our work so that it may provide a significant contribution to the enhancement of our co-operation in the humanitarian, economic, scientific and cultural fields. We sense that the expectations of the public in our countries are addressed towards this Conference which has just begun.

Like its Community partners, whose position was outlined and put forward by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, our British colleague, in the speech that he has just delivered, Italy believes that the Final Act constitutes a basic framework of reference. If we succeed in approaching East-West relations as indicated in the CSCE documents, we shall indeed increase the stability of our mutual relations and work towards a further rapprochement amongst our peoples.

In the forthcoming weeks we shall have to tackle, in a spirit which I hope will be constructive and not polemical, the problems closely affecting the relations between our States, as well as between our societies. Each single aspect of security and co-operation, and even perhaps of security through co-operation, is but a stage in a continuing process which, though slow and gradual, is, however, clear in its orientation. While we respect the diverse political, economic and social systems of

each single State, as well as their security, we should seek to recover the human and cultural unity and identity of Europe. In other words, we are not meeting here to create structures of the past, as did those who came before us, as did those plenipotentiaries of the great European Powers at the more famous Congress of Vienna; rather on the contrary we have come here to forge our future and to give our continent the kind of structure and order based on co-operation and mutual rapprochement with all due regard to the sovereignty of each State. We would have to follow the long and tortuous path as we all know, which will brook no shortcuts, no alternatives or contradictions.

The third meeting of the CSCE follow-up begins in an international context which is more propitious than that which characterized the Madrid Conference. Indeed, the reasons for concern and the points of contention between East and West were both numerous and far-reaching. However, by means of the dialogue tenaciously pursued within our forum, we have managed to overcome these differences even at the most difficult and delicate moments in recent years. In this way we have participated in and witnessed a remarkable reversal of the trend as the one underpinned *inter alia* by the Final Preparatory Document for this Conference which was adopted unanimously. In our dialogue here we have to stress the importance of co-operation between the two countries which have shared so far the greatest responsibility within the international scene. The world's reaction to the Reykjavik summit could not but enhance our awareness in this respect. We feel neither disappointed nor concerned over what occurred in the Icelandic capital, where important agreement with regard to armaments reductions was arrived at. In this respect we are reassured by the confidence expressed by both sides in that the Reykjavik contribution will provide a basis for future negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, the meetings that followed Madrid afforded us a number of excellent occasions for furthering the debate between participating States. This still holds good even for those meetings where unfortunately we could not conclude with a commonly agreed text. Our governments, and above all our public opinion, duly appreciated the significance of the agreement reached at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. This agreement, concluded after almost three years of complex negotiations, has acquired a significance, in our view,

that goes beyond the strict content as reflected in the text which is of enormous scope and value in itself. We have certainly learned the lesson from this, that it is possible to achieve concrete results when all concerned bring their will to bear for the sake-of compromise.

It is all the more significant if we consider that the field tackled by the Stockholm Conference was that of military security: that is a subject with regard to which States traditionally claim total freedom of action even though this stance appears to us somewhat out of date by now. In the immediate future a strict and effective application of the measures agreed on in Stockholm is really required to achieve a greater stability and security within our continent. Incidentally, such an application of the Stockholm measures would show the entire world that bonds of interdependence shall from now on prevail amongst the countries of the European continent. It is only in this way that we can create the conditions with the various modalities to be established for negotiating within a forum in order to achieve a balanced reduction of conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Italy, along with its partners and allies, is greatly interested in such a prospect for negotiations in the conviction that such an achievement would bring about remarkable progress in consolidating and strengthening peace in Europe. The confidence-building and security measures agreed upon in Stockholm are further designed to ensure that States fulfil their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force, with this in mind and recalling the need to respect and apply in practice the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes, Italy, along with its European Community partners, hereby affirms that this principle is of crucial importance. We do hope that the work started in Montreux and Athens on these basic issues shall prove useful to the Thirty-Five to facilitate the recourse to the instruments and procedures for settling any future conflicts. Any real progress in this direction would contribute to the concrete establishment of the primacy of law and reason over violence.

Mutual confidence, so important for security, must however be based on broader foundations than those of transparency and of reduction of the respective military systems. There has not been enough openness up to the present in many fields such as science and technology, especially in which the propensity for secrecy has been clearly felt by scientists as well as our peoples as something belonging to the past and

hence out of date. It was to this effect, to replace secrecy by the free circulation of scientific knowledge across the borders as well as to set in motion scientific research projects with the help of scientists, technicians and experts coming from various countries that an example was set some months ago in Geneva by the creation of a World Laboratory to which I had occasion to refer in my statement at the United Nations General Assembly. The World Lab is designed to promote "Science across the borders" as well as research available to all with the results achieved being shared for the benefit of all concerned. I would like to comment, incidentally, that it was the Chinese authorities who were significantly the first to join in this project. By helping on this occasion with a specific and considerable financial contribution to the World Lab, Italy wishes to build the scientific community across the borders which had so often been called for by the scientists themselves. We see now that the erstwhile scepticism has given way to the realization that only in this way shall it be possible to attain and establish for good the lasting and deeply rooted mutual security, provided of course that the results of basic and applied research be truly under control. The setting up of a scientific community across the borders would equally enhance the balance to be achieved between the industrialised and developing countries.

In this connection it might be worth saying that we cannot content ourselves with the mere statement of principles but we should rather work to ensure that specific initiatives are set in motion. In the course of time we could convene a meeting of scientists from all thirty five countries participating at the Conference. It is by comparing and checking up on our respective ideas, by making sure that the research has given us results that tally that we shall establish a secure basis for understanding and co-operation in the political sphere as well. Italy has already gained some experience in this connection thanks to the meetings held at Erice where scientists and experts from several countries had the opportunity of furthering this kind of co-operation. On the strength of this we are now prepared to organize at Erice or any other research centre in Italy a meeting of scientists from the thirty-five countries. I would like to stress the relevance to this effect of what has just been said by our colleague from Romania.

According to the Final Act, all the participating States have declared their intention to be guided in their relations with all the other States by the principles contained therein. However, we also have to bear in mind the external effects produced by the process as defined in Helsinki. We cannot afford to overlook this point if we want the process to be mutually beneficial and of use to countries not parties to the agreement. If, on the one hand, the CSCE does not encompass all countries of Europe (and I say this with some regret) because of Albania being absent, it should be stressed that the Conference is considered as important for the regions adjoining Europe; this is especially true and holds good for the Mediterranean region for which Italy has maintained as ever a special interest.

Amongst the various forms of co-operation relating to the external aspects of CSCE, our attention has been drawn today to the struggle against terrorism which, in my opinion, calls for urgent action. We face today a danger which is in fact common to us all and which respects no boundaries, be they of nations or continents, and it is for this reason that the greatest possible solidarity is called for at present. It is with this in mind and to achieve the objective before us that we must stress the importance of expanding scientific and technical co-operation, while not allowing trade, industry and ecology to lag behind. We have to do our best to achieve a greater transparency in the workings of our economies, by promoting direct contacts between the operators and by circulating information and statistical data. At the same time, we should be preparing the ground and the essential conditions for broader exchange and a greater division of labour ensuring thereby the participation of the whole of Europe in the technological revolution.

Mr. Chairman, the effectiveness of the Final Act shall be judged by its contribution to the rights of individuals. Not only does it set the example of how States should behave to each other but also how States are to treat their own people. It is not amiss to stress that even now the implementation of the principles and the various provisions which as we had agreed constitute the fundamental human rights still are far from having been implemented to the full in several of the participating States. All too often the legitimate desire for personal contact, family reunification, for freedom of movement, have not been satisfied so far. The same is true for the right to leave one's own country. Clearly the

meetings in Ottawa and Bern have not given sufficient impetus to our co-operation in the humanitarian sphere. We regret this slow down, but we would like to work in such a way that the experience gained in our debates at past encounters be furthered here in Vienna so as to render our efforts constructive. The credibility of the CSCE itself would be considerably undermined unless concrete results be achieved and palpable improvements attained in the promotion and observance of human rights after the Vienna Meeting.

Immanuel Kant, a great European, speaking about universal peace, was the first to establish the connection between internal order within each society and external concord between countries: we have had to wait a full 200 years to see this principle set out in a text. We have to do our best to make sure that we don't have to wait yet again 200 years before it is entirely implemented. In looking for factors that bring us closer together we find that the cultural sphere represents the best, the oldest means for this kind of work. In other words, it is to culture that Europe turned in its moments of greatest difficulties and trials, it is to culture that it has entrusted its identity; it is thanks to culture that the peoples of other continents have found us of interest. I am not intending to limit myself to humanism alone but wish to bring in the culture of science which was the subject dealt with so effectively by the 35 in Hamburg.

There was no final text at the end of the Budapest Meeting but it certainly provided an occasion for the meeting of men of science and art from our countries. I am convinced that we should further develop opportunities for meetings and co-operation between outstanding men of culture; this is an objective to be borne in mind as one of immediate relevance and importance within the CSCE process. It is for this reason that the Italian Government welcomes all suggestions directed at further co-operation in this field.

Mr. Chairman, the experience gained so far within the framework of CSCE, which is one of interdependence, impels us to look for broader common ground and a wider ranging dialogue on new and current issues. Moreover, we have witnessed, thanks to the meetings in Hamburg and Venice, the impetus that can be given to the process by tackling specific subjects in depth. The concluding recommendations of the Venice Meeting, which we shall have to work on at this meeting too,

provides us with avenues of action for further strengthening co-operation in the Mediterranean between the CSCE participants as well as third countries. Italy has already put these recommendations to good use. We are convinced that stronger Euro-Mediterranean links can enhance détente and diminish existing tensions in the region. In the end we have to find lasting and just solutions for the conflicts and disputes in the Mediterranean region. Italy remains committed to this course together with its European partners, keen as it is to contribute further to the development of the dialogue between the parties concerned.

Mr. Chairman, the work of the CSCE follow-up meetings is bound to provide palpable proof of the will shown by all our countries to undertake concerted action to reinforce the credibility of the process set in motion by the Final Act. From this point of view, we have to do our utmost to ensure that our debate results in real effects without allowing polemics to prevail. We are aware that there are still many shortcomings, which stem from the fact that many of the principles and rules of conduct agreed on in Helsinki and Madrid have not been observed satisfactorily and the progress in setting standards has not been carried far enough.

We are dealing here with shortcomings which stem from definite causes. In fact, it is truly difficult to undertake new commitments while obligations undertaken previously are still not entirely fulfilled. It is only if we manage to find appropriate measures to remedy these shortcomings effectively that we shall be able to strengthen co-operation between the 35 countries and thus promote further progress. All the baskets are of equal importance: they are interrelated in principle and in fact. It is only in this way that we should subsequently prove that the process started by CSCE in our continent has not lost its ability to function as a fundamental means to the dialogue between East and West.

The effectiveness and permanency of this dialogue can only be consolidated if all the countries participate fully in contributing to the European equilibrium. We are all aware that the true significance of CSCE is to be found in the interdependence between the long-term interests of each of our countries and the destiny of Europe as a whole. Our European destiny must hence be one of peace and greater civil, social and economic welfare to be gained through persistent dialogue free from any prejudgment or bias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 NOVEMBER 1990

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS GIULIO ANDREOTTI
AT THE CSCE SUMMIT IN PARIS

Mr. Chairman, in my capacity as President of the Council of the European Community, I have the honour to take the floor here both on behalf of the European Community and of Italy.

This Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of Europe, of Canada and the United States, fifteen years after the meeting that concluded with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, marks a historic transition between two eras of European history: the triumph throughout the continent of democracy and the rule of law as a result of the steadfast will of peoples to see their dream for a free and just society come true; the end of the cold war and of the last vestiges of the divisions of the Second World War; and the beginning of an era that we wish for, an era of peace and friendship among our peoples. The whole of Europe today identifies itself with the shared values of the rule of law, a pluralist society and the common respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. This is the outcome of a process that lasted for decades and one whose outcome is due for the most part to the decisive courage of those who kept the flame of reason glowing even when it seemed Utopian to make it shine in the darkness of repression. Under the new circumstances we trust that the respect and esteem of all the participating States will be channelled towards the efforts of the peoples that are peacefully trying to regain the full expression of the national identity they enjoyed until recently.

The contribution of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was also decisive. The ten Helsinki Principles constituted both a start in giving a divided Europe a common reference point, and the finishing point of its newly-found unity. Years of long and patient negotiations kept the lines of communication open, even at a time when communication seemed more difficult. This CSCE forum has

strengthened the conviction that there is no alternative to dialogue to solve problems among States. The success that we celebrate today is the best hope that we have for the future. Our Meeting in Paris is not a mere celebration; it is also, and I would say first and foremost, a solemn commitment to build a community of nations where peace and friendship shall prevail.

We will not repeat the mistakes of the past. We are sure of this, not only because of the conviction of our aim but also because we know that it is deeply rooted in the minds of our people. The wish to live among friends and with friends is now a shared feeling. What can better illustrate the new climate in Europe than the fact that the German people are now united in a single State in keeping with the principles of the Final Act and in full agreement with neighbouring countries?

Mr. Chairman, the CSCE has united the destinies of the countries of Europe and North America, thus making the common commitment to co-operation and security irreversible. Within the CSCE, the European Community and its Member States have emphasised their conviction that the protection and promotion of human rights is the prime responsibility of governments. We have always stated that their effective enjoyment is the legitimate interest of the international community and that it is inseparable from the pursuit of peace and international security. I do believe that this conviction of ours, which we have shared with many of you, has borne fruit in the course of the events which we have witnessed in Europe.

Respect for human rights is, and always will be, the cornerstone of the CSCE process. Our common interest reiterated today in Paris is that of promoting the political values and principles based on the dignity of human beings. This interest will stand as a natural barrier against any exaggerated interpretation of the role of governments and against ways of thinking, so common in the past, according to which States are islands aiming at self-sufficiency in an essentially hostile environment. However, respect for human rights must include the role that individuals can play in economic and social development. It is an increasingly shared opinion that the responsible and creative activity of individuals, exercised with respect for human dignity and in the context of social justice, is the foundation of the well-being of all our nations. This is the kind of message that we wish to convey from Paris, together with the

assurance of our willingness to work more closely together in fields such as the protection of the environment, scientific co-operation and culture, and to develop and expand the quality of our relations with the Mediterranean countries.

Mr. Chairman, the European Community has participated since the very beginning in the CSCE process. Back in 1975 when we signed the Final Act, Mr Aldo Moro, then Prime Minister of Italy and President of the Council of the European Community, stated that he was signing the Final Act of the Conference in his two-fold capacity. Since then, European integration has made major steps forward, and this is what we see in the growing participation of its institutions in the CSCE process and in the building of the new political architecture in Europe. The Community and its Member States underscore the importance that they attach to the development within the framework of the CSCE of close-knit inter-European relations, in particular with the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. My colleague Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, will illustrate the Commission's contribution to the CSCE process, together with the council, in the areas that fall within its purview. I would also emphasise that the European Parliament is represented at the Conference for the first time by its vice-President, Mr. Georges Romeos.

The CSCE has contributed significantly to the strengthening of security in Europe by limiting armaments, as shown by the signing here in Paris of the basic CFE Treaty, and also by the gradual process of strengthening security which was started with the Final Act and further developed in Stockholm and Vienna. Specific and verifiable arms control measures and security-building measures contributed to an overall climate of confidence. This in turn makes it easier to achieve agreement on other security measures. The negotiations on conventional forces in Europe and on CSEMs will continue on the basis of their current mandate, with a view to the 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. We express the wish for more structured co-operation in the field of security through discussions and consultations among the 34, so as to have, after the Helsinki Meeting, new negotiations on disarmament and on confidence- and security-building measures open to all CSCE participating States. The depth of understanding and co-operation amongst us has reached a level which, we believe, warrants the development of a new

institutional framework, one that will enable us to strengthen our dialogue. Along these lines we have decided to meet more frequently and establish a Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, backed up by a Secretariat with a view to establishing the political nucleus of this new stage of the CSCE. The latter will also be marked by the establishment of two other institutions: a Conflict Prevention Centre whose functions we can develop later and an Office for Free Elections. Lastly, we would like to emphasize the role that the parliamentary dimension can effectively play in the development of a coherent, harmonious and complete CSCE framework. Concurrently, however, we should focus our attention on the factors of instability in Europe, whose implications for security are real, though very difficult to tackle in terms of traditional defence concepts. We welcome the prospect of holding the first CSCE Meeting on National Minorities. There is also room to further develop mechanisms for third-party involvement in the peaceful settlement of disputes. We should therefore take full advantage of the opportunity tendered by the Valletta Meeting at the beginning of next year.

Mr. Chairman, Europe today can look forward to the future with enthusiasm. This Europe of ours, which is now taking shape in institutional form, stands as the fulfilment of a dream that Victor Hugo described back in 1849, and I quote: "The day will dawn in which France, Italy, Russia, England, Germany, all of you nations of the continent, will merge, without losing your distinctive features and your glorious identities, in a higher unity, and you will form a brotherhood of Europe. The day will dawn when we shall see these two immense groupings, the United States of America and the United States of Europe, facing each other and reaching out towards the other across the seas". Perhaps this wish, Mr. Chairman, is now becoming true. Thank you.

9-10 JULY 1992

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
VINCENZO SCOTTI AT THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING
IN HELSINKI

Mr. Chairman, Heads of State or Government, ladies and gentlemen, first of all I would like to express my warmest wishes and thanks to President Koivisto, and to the Government and people of Finland for their warm welcome and for the perfect organization of our work.

Helsinki recalls the history of the origins of the Final Act. With the passing of the years, it has become more and more confirmed as the fundamental charter guiding all our relationships. Europe has changed radically, and today we see ourselves united in Helsinki in a Europe which is more open, freer from ideological confrontation, nearer to the century-old aspirations of peoples from Vancouver to Vladivostok. But at the same time, it is a continent tormented by nationalism, by ethnic rivalries, by acute conflicts which run the risk of undermining the difficult process of strengthening the common values of freedom, the rule of law and mutual tolerance to which we jointly subscribed less than two years ago in the Charter of Paris.

Security in each one of our States is very closely linked to the security of other States. Security must be achieved not only through the silencing of arms, but also and above all through peaceful co-existence of peoples, respect for human rights, protection of minorities, economic well-being and environmental protection.

Mr. Chairman, the Helsinki Document gives birth to a more rational and integrated institutional structure, centred upon the collegiate political responsibility of the Council which, from now on, will be at the head of all the CSCE structures and institutions.

The setting up of a High Commissioner on National Minorities has been warmly welcomed by Italy. We would also have liked greater commitment on such subjects as self-government, local autonomy and the rights of minorities as such. Italy believes it has provided a significant

and useful contribution in this field by setting up efficient structures of local autonomy in the Alto Adige region in Italy which is a crossroads of civilization and a happy meeting point between Italy and Austria. The successful outcome of the events of in Alto Adige, which have called for a constructive spirit on the part of the Governments of Rome and Vienna, points to a method which could well be used in other political situations. This is for us a good omen and a source of great satisfaction.

Mr. Chairman, with the Helsinki Document the CSCE acquires for the first time a real operational capacity for the political management of crises, for conflict prevention and for the maintenance of peace. As time goes on we will have to monitor the functioning of measures which we have adopted, and adapt them if necessary on the basis of our experience. These measures represent in themselves a very important goal.

We are satisfied that in order to perfect the system, the CSCE has adopted appropriate measures for co-operation with other organizations, above all, the European Community, NATO and the Western European Union. The CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation brings together in one organic system military negotiations, permanent dialogue on security issues and procedures for conflict prevention. It operates through two distinct structures, the Special Committee and the Conflict Prevention Centre.

The Economic Forum of the Committee of Senior Officials will allow us to discuss the problems of consolidating market economies. It is nonetheless important that countries in a transitional phase should not fall into the trap of erecting new barriers amongst themselves instead of developing mutual relationships; any trade war can only lead to greater economic damage and political instability.

Mr. Chairman, Italy has shouldered with responsible determination the honour and the task of presiding over the CSCE Peace Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh. The Minsk Group, led by Chairman Raffaelli, is the forerunner and basic model for the ad hoc groups for crisis management, which were formally enshrined in the Helsinki Document of 1992. The Nagorno-Karabakh crisis is very complex, and it is no good hiding the difficulties or underestimating the problems involved. But the continuous worsening of the situation on the spot shows that the only alternative to dialogue and negotiation is confrontation, destruction and the loss of human lives. If they are to succeed, these negotiations will require a strong commitment on the

part of all, and full respect for the decisions and principles of the CSCE. The Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh is the instrument through which the CSCE has assumed direct responsibility for the solution of this conflict; the Italian Chairmanship will continue to work along this line, trusting in the support and commitment of the entire CSCE community.

Mr. Chairman, Italy welcomes the opening of the CSCE to the rest of the world. We are happy to welcome in this very room the representative of Japan, a privileged partner, who shares with the 52 participating States the same values and principles of the CSCE. In this connection we hope, and are indeed convinced, that the attention which has always been given to the Mediterranean area will be increased in the future, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE and through the institutional structures which underline the continuity of political interest and co-operation in this area which is essential to the stability of Europe.

Mr. Chairman, we are still far from achieving that ideal community, which for centuries represented the moral and intellectual aspirations of great thinkers such as Thomas More and Tommaso Campanella, thinkers who contributed to laying the foundations of European culture. We must at the same time recognize the effort that has gone into our Document. It sets precise aims for the well-being of our societies, and it creates instruments and mechanisms through which a common response can be provided to the very considerable difficulties which stand in the way of their implementation. The commitment involved will entail an equal effort on the part of each one of us towards demonstrating a strong political will for co-operation, inspired by those principles of tolerance and mutual understanding which represent the most authentic achievements of our common culture.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 DECEMBER 1994

ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER SILVIO BERLUSCONI
AT THE SUMMIT OF HEADS OF THE STATE
AND GOVERNMENT OF THE CSCE IN BUDAPEST

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Colleagues, President Horn has invited me to address the inaugural session of this Summit, and I thank him most sincerely both for this honour, and for his superb hospitality.

I have just come back from Naples where I had the honour and opportunity to chair the World Conference on Organized Transnational Crime. A strong signal came from Naples where all participating Countries agreed that: It is necessary to harmonize as soon as possible the basic rules governing both criminal law and law of procedure in other different Countries. This would require an harmonization of the basic legislations of the different legal systems regardless of different legal theories and traditions possibly working out a common world code encompassing all provisions and strategies to fight organized crime. The international cooperation will be most effective only when a lowest common denominator among criminal legislations will exist which can, for instance, make legislations will exist which can, for instance, make international rogatory letters and extraditions easier and smoother. Another important factor is the widening and improvement of international cooperation for the circulation of information relating to protagonists and activities of criminal organizations even beyond bilateral and multilateral agreements. The aim should be to set up a single information centre, a real worldwide network where every Country can send and get information to and from. Lastly, another very concrete proposal was made, that is to set up an International High School for the training and updating of professionals carrying out investigative and judicial activities to fight crime. In this school techniques and tools should be taught aimed at fighting organized crime in the various sectors.

Italy is willing to provide suitable premises for this School and to set up a "task force" made up by representatives of other Countries. This

task force should work out a comprehensive plan from the viewpoint of provisions, costs and funding by 1995. One year ago in Rome, my Country was entrusted with the prestigious task of Chairman-in-Office of the "new" CSCE as it emerged from its period of gestation, endowed with an array of permanent institutions. Our objective has been to continue and enhance its preventive diplomacy and crisis management role. We pursued this objective also through the work performed with insight and discretion by the High Commissioner on National Minorities, which has become the kingpin for any possible preventive strategy adopted by the CSCE, as well as through the long-term missions aimed at stabilizing and positively influencing difficult political situations in the Continent. This role has developed in close conjunction with the United Nations, each one complementing the other, originally sharing their duties on a geographic basis, but today increasingly seeking out ways of working in synergy.

In various conflict situations which posed and still pose a threat to the unity and territorial integrity of some participating States - Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan - the CSCE Missions have played a major role in setting negotiating processes in motion, flanking the diplomatic efforts of other entities. Clearly, great attention was paid to and many efforts were made for the two major crises on the Continent. As to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Italian Chairman-in-Office continued actions aiming at working out the solution acceptable to all parties concerned and at setting up a multinational peace force under the aegis of the CSCE. We do hope that this Summit will approve this initiative. With reference to the former Yugoslavia, after the serious difficulties the long-term missions met with, the CSCE can be present in the conflict areas and carry out its activity in the sectors more congenial to it, such as the protection of minorities complementing that of other international organizations. At the same time the CSCE will have to be provided with the necessary means to contribute, hopefully in the near future, in the institutional reconstruction of those areas torn by war. This subject will as well be certainly widely discussed during this Summit.

Ladies and Gentlemen, today, 5 December 1994, the date on which the CSCE Summit is opening, is also the date on which the CSCE Convention for Conciliation and Arbitration comes into effect, now that twelve instruments of ratification have been deposited. This is an

auspicious coincidence for this new instrument for conflict prevention, in which Italy has had great faith since the beginning of the arduous negotiations leading up to the decision adopted in Stockholm. My country is now ready to play a front-line role in implementing the objectives of that Convention. Lastly, we did believe that a situation of full and stable security for CSCE had necessarily to be accompanied by stronger relations with the Mediterranean region. For this purpose, we have deployed our efforts for a broader involvement in the work of the CSCE by Israel, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Looking further into the future, we believe that the CSCE can make a substantial contribution to peace and stability in that region putting itself forward as a benchmark especially in terms of safety measures in the political, military sectors as well as an organization model for cooperation and security in that area.

And now let us speak of the future. We all stressed many times that the end of the two blocks and the end of the cold war require us to rethink the instruments and institutions for security. This Summit could mark an important step forward in the ongoing debate. History provides us with two classical models of conduct in international relations, both negative and both sources of tension: the first isolationism; the second is the rationale of blocks and mutual balance deterrence. Luckily, today it may be possible to have a different, better and more advanced model based on the joint management of every actual or potential conflict by all the States in the region. Is CSCE an appropriate tool, can it perform this task? We do believe it can. Within the framework of the European and Transatlantic Organizations, the CSCE has a specific role and originality of its own, and possesses operational capabilities that have not yet been fully exploited. The Budapest Summit can lay the foundations for the CSCE to be developed as a structure, a regional arrangement, a suitable tool that, according to Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, could alleviate the awesome duty of the United Nations to guarantee peace and stability. This could be done in two complementary ways: one could be encouraging a closer cooperation between all the Institutions for security in the Continent, without any one ranking higher than the others; that is a more concrete and stronger cooperation between NATO, NACC, the WEU and the CSCE, which would grant every Country on the Continent a full participation in a common


security system. Furthermore, the Budapest Summit could layout the framework and issue a mandate for the future development of arms control measures in Europe, consolidating the substantial results already achieved with the CFE Treaty, but also making provision for additional measures, especially at the regional level, to gear the continental security system to new situations and new needs as they arise. In order for these broad objectives to become true a more effective political will by Participating States is needed as well as the concrete support by the members of the U.N. Security Council. As of January, 1st next year Italy will be one of them and will work for this purpose.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished colleagues, the fact that the CSCE was up to now only partially successful in crises management and conflict resolution does not imply a weak vocation in these areas. Rather, these results demonstrate that a strengthening of the CSCE is useful. I am confident that the Budapest Summit will set that "virtuous circle" in motion, starting with the political will of increasing human and financial resources - so to act more effectively. This in turn will enhance the CSCE capability of action and its credibility. Hence the Participating States will be spurred to step up their commitment. Together with this hope, I would like to express my very best wishes to the new Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE. He is about to shoulder a task which will require all those qualities of imagination, energy and faith which the young Hungary is so largely endowed with. As a member of the Troika, Italy is ready and willing to provide all of its support. The feeling with which we hand the Chair to President Horn is a belief which moved from our mind to our heart during our Chairmanship: we must believe in this CSCE, we must help this instrument of peace, security and welfare to progress in the interest of all Peoples of our Continent.

I wish you all a successful work.

HISTORICAL POSTERS OF CSCE EVENTS
(1988 – 1991)

1988 – 1991



*Seminar on Human Rights and Religious Freedom in Europe
for Peace and in the Spirit of Helsinki*
VENICE, 3 – 6 FEBRUARY 1988



*First CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension
PARIS, 30 MAY – 23 JUNE 1989*

1988 – 1991




Second CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension
COPENHAGEN, 5 – 29 JUNE 1990



CSCE Ministerial Meeting
NEW YORK, 1 – 2 OCTOBER 1990

1988 – 1991



CSCE Summit
PARIS, 19 – 21 1990

HISTORICAL POSTER OF CSCE EVENTS



*CSCE Symposium on the cultural Heritage
CRACOW, 28 MAY – 7 JUNE 1991*

1988 – 1991



First meeting of the Ministerial Council of the CSCE
BERLIN, 19 – 20 JUNE 1991



Third CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension
MOSCOW, 10 SEPTEMBER – 1 OCTOBER 1991

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The book includes contributions by Lamberto Zannier, Luciano Monzali, Federico Imparato, Paolo Soave, Giuseppe Spagnulo and Matteo Gerlini.

Andrea Cascone is an Italian diplomat, currently Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE in Vienna.

In copertina: Aldo Moro, Prime Minister of Italy, at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, 1 August 1975 (ARCHIVIO ANSA)

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